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CHAPT&&I
INTRODUCTION
. . . Moral judgments constitute the real answer
to the existence of lobbyists. ... In the long run,
a civilised morality is the sole key to the survival
of democracy.
-- Stephen K. Bailey
Buchanan Committee (1950)
Lobbying and Federal Legislation in the United States
The emergence oi the Federal Government as a tremendous social
and economic force, accelerated since the early 1930's, has significantly
affected the health, wealth, and security of individual citizens. Because
lobbyists serve as a link between interest groups and Congress in the
American democracy, lobbying activities affect the welfare of the populace
to a far greater extent than most American® realise.
This thesis concentrates on the activities of the lobbyist to influ*
ence policy, largely through efforts to secure passage or defeat of con-
gressional legislation. Where appropriate, it spotlights the activities o(
the two largest business lobbying groups, the National Association of
Manufacturers (HAM) and the Chamber oi Commerce oi the United States.
Although the U. 3, Constitution guarantees the right to petition,
lobbying nevertheless is generally the subject of distrust by the public and
the press. The general public has stereotyped lobbyists and lobbying
I

activities as dealing in bribes, blondes, and booze to dazx-le the docile
legislator.
Title III of the Legislative Re organisation ct of 1946 is the only
legislation ever passed by the U.S. Congress regarding the regulation oi
lobbying. This Regulation oi' Lobbying Act is based on the principle oi
disclosure of the scope and size of efforts to influence legislation, as
opposed to the control or complete elimination of these attempts to
influence.
The Research Question
The research question of this thesis is: Is it feasible for the
Congress to enact legislation that will accurately reveal the sixe and
scope of a lobbyist's efforts to influence the congressional decision-
making process, while respecting the individual rights guaranteed under
the First Amendment
Research Methodology
As the essence of this thesis is a historical overview of federal
regulation of lobbying in the United States, the majority of the data pre*
sented were gathered iroffn secondary sources. These included the
Congressional Record , congressional committee hearings and reports,
Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
,
publications, judicial decisions, the
One minor exception was a direct ancestor of the i«H6 Act
which was effective only for the 44th Congress. This 13?6 law is dis-
cussed briefly in Chapter 111.

outstanding works of such authoritative authors as Kenneth G. Crawford,
James Daakin, Lester If, Milbr&th, and works by less well known stu-
dents oi lobbying*
The writer's collection, compilation, and analysis of primary
data were greatly aided by his physical presence in the Nation's capital.
Many potential obstacles were averted by the availability of a vast
amount of expertise in the Legislative Branch and elsewhere in the
Washington, D, C. , metropolitan aroa. Although only three personal
interviews are credited in the bibliography, numerous other persons
assisted the writer in locating and analysing the primary and secondary
data that combined to produce this work.
—animation of the Thesis
Wi ll irf* —f. -*0'>W» .-WWW»W W-.I1>.—«*^-»'. H l « l <Wlli»WI
The second chapter describes the role of the lobbyist and the
activities he engages in to attempt to influence the congressional decision"
making process in his favor. It discusses the functions oi the lobbyist
in congressional committee hearings: providing invaluable information
in his field ot endeavor to Congress and collaborating with other lobby-
ists to influence legislation and policy. The congressman, the lobbyist,
and their interactions are discussed next, followed by a description of
'grassroots or indirect lobbying, considered by many to be the most
effective lobbying technique today. And finally, the activities of the
NAM, the Chamber ox Commerce of the United States, and other
business lobby groups mirror the businessman as a lobbyist.

To furnish the reader with a historical perspective of the subject
of lobbying, Chapter 111 outlines lobbying activities from the start of lobby
<
tag in the outer lobbies of the House oi Commons three centuries ago to
I
the enactment of the Federal Regulation oi" Lobbying Act of 1946 on
August Z, 1946.
Chapter IV discus sea the judicial interpretations oi the 1946 Act
and the relatively few congressional investigations that explored the sub*
ject of effective regulation of lobbying activities.
Reforms and Remedies, ' the fifth chapter, outlines the major
loopholes of the 1946 Act. These loopholes, the ambiguous definitions
of direct communication and principal purpose, and the lack of an agency
to administer and enforce the 1946 Act are discussed. Also discussed
are the two major proposals of the Ninetieth Congress, the Legislative
Reorganization Acts of 1967 and 19£3, and their respective provisions.
In the concluding chapter the writer presents his views of what
would constitute a more effective lobbying Act.
1A copy of the Act appears in the Appendix.

CHAPTER II
THE LOBBYIST
A lobbyist is anyone who opposes legislation I want.
A patriot is anyone who supports me. *
••Senator James A, Reed of Missouri
A curious aspect of our society Is that many oi us use the word
lobbyist to refer to something evil, to condemn pressure activities by
hostile groups. There has been extensive confusion over the correct <J«Ci-
nition oi the word lobby since its first recorded use in 1329, the year
Andrew Jackson became President. H was originally applied in state poli-
tics to seekers after special privilege at the capitol in Albany, Mew York.
There, Thuriow Weed and others soon made the title lobby agent well
Z
and unfavorably known. This term was shortened to lobbyist by jour*
3
nalists and was in frequent use In the Nation's capital in the early I&SO's.
The term lobbying has recovered somewhat from the stigma of
corruption attached to it in the 1370's and ISSO's. However, its true sig-
nificance is still not widely understood. The three definitions listed below
Karl SchJriftgiesaer, The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of
Influencing lawmakera (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1951), p. I*
Ibid.
, p. 5.
Congress and the Nation, 194 5•1964: A Review of Government
and Politics in the Post-war Years (Washington: Congressional Quarterly
Service, 1965), p. 1547.

represent today's comrron usage of the term.
Webster's Third New international Dictionary teiis us that to
lobby is to conduct activities with the objective of influencing public offi-
cials and members of a legislative body with regard to legislation and
other policy decisions. Another narrow definition of lobbying which seems
appropriate to the writer is that activity engaged in by anyone who is
required to register or report on his spending under the terms of the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, And finally, in its broadest
application, and with the connotation it carries In this thesis, the term
lobbyist is used interchangeably with the term 'pressure group' to mean
any organisation or person that carries on activities which have as their
j
ultimate aim to influence the decisions of Congress ...
The lobbyist 9*gik<i to perceive his occupation as carrying less
prestige than other professions. He is admittedly the subject of coasid*
arable public disapproval, stemming partly from a general misunderstand*
ing of his function and his right to petition as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, In fact, public disapproval of lobbyists and lobbying Is so pronounced
that today's lobbyist usually admits to his profession by that designation
only reluctantly and qualiiiedly, preferring one of the more respectable-
sounding appellations, such as Washington counsel, ashington repre~
seatative, legislative representative, legislative counsel, or
"legislative liaison man.
'ibid.

Samuel Patterson provides an overview of the discussion of the
varied tasks of today's lobbyist:
He is th«j legislative representative who conceives Mi jo© to be
that of making crucial contacts with the members of the legislative
group. He <devt>tes his time and energies to walking legislative halls,
visiting legislators, collaring them in the halls, establishing rela-
tionships with administrative assistants and others of th© coagress*
man's staff, cultivating key legislators on a friendship basis, and
developing contacts on the staffs of critical legislative committees.
The most general way to describe the nature of the lobbyist's job
is to note that he must in some way communicate with a&4 influence gov*
ernmental decision makers. This thesis concerns the relationships
between the lobbyist and the decision makers in the legislative Branch.
The lobbyist is important to this 3Mation*s political processes because he
plays the political game expertly and tirelessly. t*$k* a member of a
jungle patrol, he probes for th@ enemy** weak point- -that is, the branch
of government least hostile to the attainment of his goals. In the United
States, Congress occupies that exposed flank and. must ward off the
attacks of special-interest groups that may have only limited concern for
the public interests. From the lobbyist's viewpoint, it is advantageous
for him to concentrate his efforts upon the Legislative Branch and thus
have maximum time available for services to the legislators and their
staffs.
Mmf---'"*"*"*—
•
MMk' vnvim!**.** > mrn iim mm********
jHarmon &eigler. Interest Groups in American Society (gngla*
wood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196$), p. 267, quoting Samuel
Patterson.

8The nature oi a lobbying assignment largely determine© the appro*
priate career background, but most lobbying tasks are very similar to
legislative tasks. These tasks usually involve considerable interaction
with other persons and a concern with federal policy problems. Perhaps
this explains Milbrath's unumg that three-fourths oi the lobbyists he sur-
veyed had law cegrees and more than ball had previously worked for the
ifederal Government. James Deakin towati that The predominance
appointive office in the political backgrounds of lobbyists . . . _in<'icaten_
that lobbyists are more likely to be recruited from the Executive Branch
I
than irom the .Legislative Branch.
The lobbyist is a valuable and necessary participant in the go -
ernmentai process as an advocate of a particular viewpoint and legislative
desires, MilbratV* explanation or the United State* having more lobby-
ists than other nations today is;
It is characteristic of interests that they seek representation
In governmental eeciaion making; if they cannot iind adequate repre-
sentation through formal governmental or semi-governmental chan-
nels, they will Meek other channels.
2. The governmental decision process in the United States is
so diffuse that groups mu*t hire lobbyists to give them eyes ami
ears at the »eat or government --as necessary insurance.
2. Americal {political/ parties are ao heterogeneous that they
must compromise group interest* rather than clearly speak tor them.
Lester . ilbrath. The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand
McNally h Company, 1963), p. 156.
Z
Ibid.
,
quoting James Eeakin.

94. . . . Interest groups in the United States have almost aban-
donee working through parties and instead have hired lobbyists to
secure policy representation.
Congressmen appear to consider the primary justification for the
lobbyist to be that he serves as a vehicle for conveying information and
opinion from \ arious segment* of the public to the Congress.
It is especially important that the lobbyist b® well-informed on
the subject ot concern to his organisation; but he should also know a
great deal about the legislative and political process and should be
widely read and well-Informed on the major problems of contempo-
rary society. *
Today's lobbyist has earned the reputation of being an expert, competent
and well-informed in his field.
Functions of the Lobbyist
Congress
i
onal Committee s
The Buchanan Committee described the role of yesteryear's
lobbyist in congressional hearings thus:
In the days when lobbying meant little more than unabashed
bribery, committees of Congress were the favorite focus of the
old lobby barons. Then, as now, crucial decisions were made in
Committee, and men having entree to them could quietly make the
necessary arrangements. The committees are even more impor-
tant in the modern legislative process, but with the institution in
'.911 of open hearings on all major legislation the possibilities of
easy influence diminished. 3
,
Ibicu, p. 199.
^
Ibid.
, p. 141.
3
U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Lobbying Activi'
ties. General Interim Report, Report No. S138, 8 1st Cong. , 2d$ess»,
1950, p. It.
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Congressional committees hold hearings on every major bill, and
all lobby group* concerned are anxious to testify. The typical lobbyist
today is sophisticated enough to realize that testimony presented at con-
gres iional hearings may have doubtful value in influencing the committee
members, many oi whom may have already made up their mind*. How-
Z
ever, students of lobbying disagree on this point. Scott and Hunt's stu; y"
indicated that testifying at hearings was the single most effective lobbying
technique and provided the most appropriate forum in which lobbyists
could plead their case. Meanwhile, Charles i-, Clapp said;
If the purpose of testifying extends beyond the desire to impress
the organisation's membership with the vigor and activity of its
leadership, there are skeptics who believe the results disappoint-
ing. *
iglf considers the lobbyist's testimony at hearings to have
marginal value, stating:
If the hearings are given good press coverage, there is the
opportunity for an interest group to pick up some inexpensive pub-
licity, hiie this is of limited value in influencing the outcome of
the legislation, widely publicised testimony at least gives the
lobbyist the opportunity to demonstrate to his organization that he
is doing his job properly. *
A more detailed discussion of the congressman and the lobbyist
is presented later in this chapter.
Margaret A. Hunt and Andrew Is* Scott, Congres* and Lobbiea --
i:-^ r,g agd -e iltW (Ck*p#l mill I ni ersity o North Carolina Prass, HK -),
p. 77.
Charles i#. Clapp, The Congressman--Hia Work as He Sees It
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 169.
Zeigier, Interest Groups in A merican Society, p. 256.

Nevertheless, congressmen generally give apparent attention and
consideration to a lobbyist's testimony before a committee. Vhiie they
tend to discount the effectiveness! of lobbying tactics, th* iact remains that
it is easier to stop a bill at one hurdle in a legislative passage than to get
it over eight or ten hurdles and signed into law. Thus, Congress's own
rules and procedures afford the lobbyist a substantial advantage by making
it easier to defeat legislation than to enact it. With respect to the success
of a given legislative proposal, the committee Is usually more important
than the whole House or Senate, the members of congressional committees
exercising life or death power over the outcome of legislation. Thus,
access to these members is a key part of the lobbyist's strategy. In fact,
if the goals of the lobbyist conflict with those of the committee chairman,
he must devise a scheme of circumventing the chairman. The committee
staff can also provide a useful point oi access to the committee's decision
process, and many lobbyists prefer to confer with staff members than
with the congressmen.
There is little evidence of the ability of today's lobbyist to keep
members of committees in his vest pocket, or of the corruption that
Woodrow Wilson, as a student of government, ob^mrv^A long before he
became an active participant in politics. He blamed the committee sys-
tem, under which most important legislation is framed and given its origi-
nal impetus, for most 01 the skulduggery.
enneth G. Crawford, The Pressure Boys: The Inside Story of
Lobbying in America (New York: Julian Messner, Inc. , 1939), p. 42.

u'^n« of M libretti's congressional respondeat* evaluated lobbyist®*
testimony as follows:
The information we get from lobbyists in appreciable but not
substantially important. ... 1 like to get lobbyist information
through hearings and get it on the record. Then people can see
the information and out it to- the acid test. The opponent Is espe-
cially important here} he checks the information and challenges it
once it is on the record. An opponent is likely to quickly catch an
error and call it to account. *
Congressman Emanuel Celier (D-N. Y.) felt that there was noth*
tag more informative and helpful to a legislative committee than to hear
the views of competent, weli*matched advocates on Ilia opposite sides of a
2
legislative issue.
The Information Function
Today** congressman feels that he is not much more obligated to
a lobbyist when he avails himself of his information facilities than he would
be to the information clerk at a local airport* One reason that the informa-
tion function does not give the lobbyist greater leverage is that he does not
have a monopoly on information.
The congressman's need for accurate information provides the
lobbyist with his best opportunity to influence policy, la nearly all of his
influence attempts, the lobbyist competes with numerous other would-be
MUbraih. The Washington Lobbyists, p. 3C*S»
anuel Celier. Pressure Croups in Congress. Vol. 319 of
Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies, ed. by Donald C,
Blaisdeli {Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social
Science* September, 19531, p. *?.
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imluencers. The lobbying process is essentially a communication process,
and the task of the lobbyist is to iinvi ways to communicate mors effectively
than his opponent in order to influence the decision makers.
An important self-balancing {actor that eases the impact of lobby-
ing on legislative decisions is that nearly every push in one direction stim-
ulates an opponent or coalition of opponents to push in the opposite riirec-
tion. Curiously, many lobbyists welcome opposition because, without it,
they might be unemployed.
Just as President Johnson is acutely aware of his alleged 'credi-
bility gap " with the American public on Vietnam and other key issues in
1963, today's lobbyist is conscious ox the image he projects to the legisla-
tor. Perhaps his most important task is to insure favorable reception of
his position by the decision makers.
A quotation £rom one of Milbrath's lobbyist respondents empha-
sises the necessity tor credibility;
A reputable lobbyist must be very careful whom he represents.
He may lose a great deal of prestige if he represents cases or clients
that may come into conflict. It is extremely important that a con-
gressman think of a lobbyist as a kind of doctor that he can depend
on. Unless a congressman has real confidence in a lobbyist, that
lobbyist simply does not have much Influence. The greatest compli-
ment one can get is for a member of Congress to say, Whatever
that fellow tells you, you can depend on it. *
As merchants of information, most lobbyists are especially care-
ful never to present inaccuracies or distortions. As a matter of fact,
some lobbyists have discovered that it helped their presentation to state
Milbrath, The Washington lobbyists , p. 2 It I.
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both sides of an argument. A balanced presentation carries an aura ol
objectivity and self•restraint that is likely to appeal to the decision maker.
With such a ^reat number and variety of demands on the limited
time and attention of the decision maker®, the lobbyist must develop
rapport with key decision makers to insure access to the legislators.
This relationship must be built on trust and integrity. The decision
makers' acceptance of a lobbyist's view* cam be gained only if the lobbyist
builds a reputation lor reliability, James Deafcin says that virtually every
lobbyist views his position in more practical term*:
I've got a living to make in this town, 1 can't afford to mislead
a congressman to gain an advantage on one particular issue, 1 will
be around long alter that issue is gone, and so will the Congressman.
Despite the fact that legislators control the setting up and enforce*
ment of the rules of trust and the discretion Cor admitting a lobbyist to the
trust relationship, the flow ol information is not a one-way process.
Often, the congressman contacts the lobbyist in search of factual data, as
witness John E. Heyke's (Chairman ol the Council ol" Local Gas Companies)
testimony before the McClellan Committee:
It was not long after the opening ol the Washington office was
announced £J95$/ that inquiries began to come Irora members of
the Senate and their staffs, seeking factual data which brought the
staff of the Council into communication with members of the Senate
and their staff- Z
»>,^W <*,*' i ,w»M i i . »i,.T» i .-(miim .»«<,! iw hhj|» i "'*» ' n '. *»m •^•rm»ri^'-m'**-imi*mwm*m* i>:4iwW*hwm« ,<w.'''«i-#i»wi, i—wii+wnmw," h-».iD)*iiv*iitwJ*.*».*i».
* James Deakin, The Lobbyists (Washington, B.C.: Public
Affairs Press, 1966), p. 194.
2,
U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee, To Investigate
Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions, Hearings
,
before a special committee. Senate, 84th Cong. , 2d Seas., 1956, p. 210.
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JDeakin says that the lobbyist considers his research activities
second in importance only to personal contacts with individual congress*
men. * However, congressmen mast carefully evaluate every research
report in terms of the method* the reputation o£ the researcher* and the
strength 01 the impact of the findings. While the mere availability of
research and information does not guarantee that all possible points of
view will be brought out* the lobbyist generally has a factual basis for hi*
messages, especially when he provides facts about how a contemplates
action will affect his own group.
Some lobbyists estimate that fully half of the bills dropped in the
hopper* many of a highly technical nature* are written in whole or in part
by lobbyists. Much of the research effort of the lobbyist is directed
toward the drafting of legislation and ghostwriting of speeches to be given
on the Senate or House floor or as testimony before congressional com-
mittees.
Often a minor, generally overlooked incident provides the clue to
the extent of the lobbyist's activities, such as speech writing, as illustrated
below:
During the Senate debate on the reorganisation bill in the second
session of the Seventy-fifth Congress, /Senator Edward R. / Burke
-Neb^/ and Senator Harry Byrd (JbJ of Virginia made speeches
condemning the administration measure. They spoke at different
times. Neither listened to the other. When the Congressional
]
MUbrath, The Washington Lobbyists, p. IZ1.
Z
Deakln, The Lobby1st a
, p. fc.

16
Rec ord cam* out the next day it was discovered that they had said
precise!/ the same thing in precisely the same way. The texts of
the two speeches ioliowed each other word lor word, paragraph
after paragraph. The speech obviously had been furnished in dupli-
cate by aom« outsider interested in beating reorganisation.
In fact, a large portion of the Congressional Hocord is commonly viewed
as free propaganda lor interest groups.
Collaboration
Virtually every major legislative issue that comes before
Congress involves collaboration between different interest groups and
frequently includes governmental decision makers. This collaboration is
brought about by the theory that the public interest consists of the sum of
the private Interests and that a broadened base of support facilitates the
passage of a particular policy proposal through Congress. The following
is an early example of such collaboration between organisations:
^The lobbyists for industry and management In the I920*s had
/an/ . . organisation called the Monday Lunch Club. These
lobbyists, representing such groups as the National Petroleum
Association, the American Meat Packers, and the Portland Cement
Association, met every Monday for lunch to exchange information
of mutual interest. More than sixty separate lobbying organisations
were part of this grou?, and their members could pool a vast reser-
voir of invaluable intelligence on the House and the Senate for the
entire business community.
Miibrath describes the lobbyist's shifting pattern of opponents
from one issue to another as a 'whirlpool of groups. This pattern of
»»»»*—
»
t—- mnn ii w hom . i i nnm iinia ii -v. 1 i«i. iii» ii . i m i ><< -'-"w <w-i.»i^i1wwv.-»v lw>..«r'""mni« i*iiii*'
Crawford, The Pressure Boys
, p. 3 J.
Z
Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy--The House of Represents.*
tives (Hew York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963), p. 224.
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whirlpools will take shape for a battle, and, once it is over, the pattern
will break up, shift, and reform for the next battle. The anticipated beha-
vior of opponents is an important determinant of a lobbyist's strategy.
The most important service that the lobbyist and his governmental collab-
orators perform for each other is the mutual exchange of information.
Collaboration is more readily accepted by the governmental decision
makers when it involves groups with common policy interests, as opposed
to the rare collaboration that might pair such organisations as the National
Association of Manufacturers and the AFJL-CIO lobbying for the same issue.
These trade-offs between organizations are the cause of Washington being
labeled as a "big nest of back acratchers.
However, this collaboration also makes It difficult for a lobbyist
to develop a sense of profession in lobbying:
Among lobbyists, their primary affiliation is with their employer,
and a lobbyist has to preserve his detachment from the other lobbyists
with whom he works. You may have to work with the guy one day and
fight him the next. Therefore, you can't develop a very close affilia-
tion. The successful lobbyist is one who lives his job for twenty-four
hours a day. One cannot be palling around too much. It would be
similar to generals of opposing armies belonging to the same officers'
club. Yet there is still an unexpressed feeling among lobbyists of
doing the same thing. These are people; even though they would be
working against each other at times, they are still engaged in the
same kind of endeavor and activity, and they feel this. Although
lobbyists get together in groups to discuss tactics on specific prob-
lems, they do not exchange their personal techniques or approaches
to the solution of problems.
MUbrath, The W ashington Lobbyists, p. 1 70.
''Ibid. ^Ibid.
, p. 135.

IS
Party Politics
A central question concerning tbe ethics oi: lobbying is: When is
a campaign contribution a legitimate donation to a legislator an when is
it an inducement for the purpose of influencing his vote on legislation I
Currently, candidates spend as much as several million dollars to run for
the Senate from a populous state, and as much as $50, 000 to $500, 000 to
get elected from a House district. This suggests their need for extensive
contributions from many sources. While the campaign contribution is a
potentially important lobbying weapon, Milbrath views the lobbyist's hesi-
tancy to build contracts with any one party as being derived from two
factors:
First, most lobbyists believe that political parties per se have
little influence on governmental decisions.
The seconc factor leading to little party contact is lobbyists*
belief that, since they must work with elected officials from both
political parties (nearly all respondents report that they work
both sides of the aisle'*), they try to avoid becoming too closely
identified with one party.
Most lobbyists have had little or no experience in party politics,
and many of those with such experience dropped their political activity
when they became lobbyists because they felt personal political activity is
of negligible value to the kind of influence they are seeking. It is true that
a good many Washington lobbyists are frequent contributors to party com-
mittees and to individual members of Congress. However, when they give,
it is in the interests of good government" or 'because Congressman
\lbid., p. ^0?.
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So-and-So is an old and dear friend of wine. The lobbyist often assign*
to pure coincidence the fact that the Congressman whom he supports just
happens to be a member ©J' a committee handling legislation in which he
is interested. It appears that improved methods for financing political
campaigns would alleviate the dependence of electee officials on lobbyists
for campaign funds.
Apparently the party with which a man Identifies has relatively
I
little importance in Ms selection as a lobbyist. The access* which a
lobbyist must achieve extends to decision .makers oi both parties, since
the informal structure of power in legislative bodies cuts across party
lines.
One basic principle of lobbying that tends to encourage the lobby-
ist to participate in party politics when the opportunity presents itself is:
It i» not enough merely to lobby incumbent congressmen.
There may not be enough of them who see things the way you do.
You have to get out and try to elect some more. *
It remains a characteristic of modern-day lobbying that the flow of com-
munication between lobbyist and party would probably be much heavier if
the lobbyist perceived party officials and organisations as having substan-
tial power avmt governmental decisions. This view contrasts sharply with
Crawford's remark in b?39 that The most advantageous position for a
Ibid., p. 277.
Z
Deakin, The Lobbyists, p. 144.

lobbyist is a place on the national committee of the party in power.
The Congressman and the Lobbyigt
In each session, the Congress ie expected to pass on complex
issue*, often involving highly technical data. No member has the energy,
knowledge, time, or the breadth of interest to be familiar with the full
range of twentieth-century issues thrust upon him. The lobbyist, by per-
forming his information function, can help the individual legislator sort
out tact from fiction and help to guide him through the ma*e of proposed
legislation that may affect the lives of millions of citizens.
Associated with the low esteem that most American* accord poli-
ticians is the fact that they also find it easy to believe that Congress is a
tool of vested interests. However, the only direct influence that a lobbyist
can have on congressional decision making is achieved through the indi-
vidual congressman or his staff. While a lobbyist can try to influence a
congressman, whether the congressman actually feels that pressure is
debatable. The Scott and Hunt study indicated that, contrary to popular
belief, moat of the congressional respondents did not feel pressure from
I
lobbyists in either their areas of peripheral or working interests.
Congressmen generally accept the lobbyist's contacts as an
expected part of their daily routine. The congressman is not a fecal point
Crawford, The Pressure Boys, p. $.
t am! Scott, Congress and Lobbies, p. 56.

t!
of ceaseless lobbying oat of concern tor bis area of special interest,
although he is more likely to be contacted concerning controversial issue*
than those with less public attention.
th the growing complexity of the American society, the legis-
lator tend* to become a broker among competing interests in the politi-
cal marketplace rather than a direct representative of the people. Despite
the shift o: emphasis toward the grassroots approach, * some authorities
like V iibrath still believe that the most effective lobbying tactic is the
2
lobbyist's personal presentation of his case to the decision re>Ak*t.
There are still many active lobbyists who devote substantial portions oi
their energies toward the goal of establishing connection®. One of
*
: iibrath 's respondents summed up the utility oi' contacts in this way:
The main advantage of having contacts is that you doa't have to
qualify yourself every time that you approach someone, li you know
people well enough, you may be able to get a hearing without delay,
of course, II they Know you well enough and don*t like you, you may
never get a hearing.
When the lobbyist makes personal presentations, he does not aim
his message indiscriminately. For each legislative issue there is a key
man or group of men to whom others will look for guidance. The lobbyist
tries especially hare to persuade these men. However, the competent
lobbyist does not dissipate good will on any but the most i portant issues,
The grassroots approach is discussed in more detail later in
this chapter.
M iibrath, The Washington lobbyists, p. £1$.
ibk
. , p. 65.

which may explain why lobbyists spend *o little time dealing directly with
members oi* Congress.
The effectiveness) of a lobbying group is noticeably affected by the
calibre* personality, and approach ox its representative. However, it is
probable that the success of the contact HUM depends even more upon the
degre* to which the legislators agree with the professed ideals of the
group for whom the lobbyist is speaking. This, in turn, depends more
upon the personal ideology oC the legislator than upon the ability of the
lobbyist to manipulate or persuade.
An estimate of the importance of a lobbyist's participation or
contribution during a congressional controversy is likely to be greatly
influenced by the individual congressman's impressions of that lobbyist.
If the policy positions of well-known Interest groups receive widespread
attention, congressmen are likely to attribute importance to those groups.
Most congressmen feel that the impact of any one organisation rarely
extends beyond its special sphere of interest. These well-known groups
are usually the ones that members of Congress or their staffs will contact
for such services as writing speeches, drafting legislative bills, and so
forth.
Since relatively few legislators are actually changed by lobbying
from a hostile or neutral position to a friendly one, most lobbyists work
their own side of the fence. The chief lobbyist of one ck the Nation's most
prominent farm organisations said, Our principal activity is to provide
A
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factual material, speeches, and other service* to the senators and con-
gressmen who are already on our side. A large part of ail lobbying is
aimed at persuading a congressman to devote more of hi** limited time &nd
energy to a specific bill or policy, or, in other words, enlist him as a
champion for a particular cause.
A & mentioned previously, the lobbyist spends little time with the
legislator, preferring instead to contact the congressman** staff assistants.
Contacts with these staff members facilitate the Clow of information to &n&
from the congressman, and in certain cases have provided the lobbyist
with valuable inside information. However, not every lobbyist wants
this intelligence :
1 don't have any «ources of inside Information, and. I don*t want
any. 1 would rather not be told things in confidence. About every-
thing that is going to happen In this town 1 found out yesterday at
Burning Tree Country Club. Then, if I have been told this thing in
confidence and it leaks out, the person who has told it to me calls
me and accuses me of having let it go. Actually, it i« almost impos-
sible to keep things quiet in this town. Those lobbyists who pretend
they have inside information in order to try and get clients are
99 per cent bluff. Anybody who hires them is likely to get disap-
pointed because there is very little inside information in this town.
A contact is useful only to the extent it gets you a hearing. 1 have a
thousand people I can caU, and if a phone call is put through, they
will listen. 2
Most congressmen view the lobbyist merely as a source of infor-
mation and opinion. The staff members, on the other hand, aware that
!
Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel
— — «!. — !—— ,~ I I .J I I « l»».l — II «*»,
Mil: The University of North Carolina Press, I960), p. JS2.
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Milbrath, The Washington Lobby ists, p. 261.
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^rmation from lobbyist* and interest group* is generally slanted, tend
to evaluate it carefully. They consider the motives and the special interest
oi ths organisation in making their judgment* However, congressmen
clearly benefit from the presentation of different arguments and viewpoints.
They feel that it is the privilege of the lobbyist to propose , but that it
remains their unquestioned prerogative to dispose , course, the
lobbyist is delighted to be able to propose, for he knows no better way to
affect policy than to be in on its creation. Most lobbyists feel that they
are ma; ing an important contribution to the legislative process; hence, the
frequency oi their consultation on policy formulation is, in their judgment,
a partial measure of their success. One congressman was mildly critical
of the lobbyist's contribution to the formulation of broad policy. I doubt
if the lobbyist has much to say except when he gets down to specific
language of particular sections ot bills: he Is not very effective on broad
policy.
Lobbyists make it difficult to achieve broad national agreement on
which legislative actions are best for the Nation as a whole. There is
almost the threat that too much reliance on lobbyists to take the initiative
can result in failure of urgent problems to get adequate governmental
action. A common complaint is that lobbyists (i. e. , business groups)
serve the selfish minorities to mislead both the people and thair
Hunt and Scott, Congress and Lobbiet, p. .19.
IM ilb rath, The Vashlngton Lobbyists, p.
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representatives i»to the belie* that great wealth for a small number will
somehow trie ie down through the system to the humblest citi*eu. These
minorities then pay lip service to the national welfare but place primary
emphasis on the specific interests of their own group. The power at the
few may not be as mighty as it was la the past* but the lact remains that
Congress may be temporarily frightened but is seldom influenced by the
demands ol underdog citizens. It is the well dressed and the well heeled,
I
who can afiore to entertain, who have the most effect on legislation.
A Democrat who did not doubt the ability to influence legislation
had a more serious criticism*.
I feel very strongly that the lobbies need to be exposed. Lobby-
ists mislead their own members much more than they inform Con-
gress. They seem determined to keep their membership ln£lamed
in order to justify their existence. Nine -nine per cent of the infor*
mation they disseminate is misleading and many false statements
are made. The reaction ol the public shows that the people just
don't know what is going on. The lobbyists as they presently perform
their responsibilities are not rendering service to the Nation or to
the people they represent* For the roost part, they are pretty intelli-
gent men, and 2 can't understand why they do, but nearly all of therm
seem determined to distort the true picture in order to justify their
own existence. *
The lobbyist does not always consider it part of hia job to achieve
or maintain the proper relationship between his group's interests and the
general public interest. A handy tool for any lobbyist is something he calls
feel --adaptability and intuition honed by past experiences on the hill. *
MMNMP'^-|MM,^o Mw*-Ay-'— . **mt*r •--*MW
Crawford, The Pressure Boys
, p. 43.
Clapp, The Congressman, p. *77.
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The modern lobbyist normally utilize* this feel to get the nMMII he can
(or his clients In any given (situation, regardless of what the public interest
might be.
Although It may sound exciting to be a lobbyist and to be intimately
involved (directly or Indirectly) In helping legislators work out compro-
mises and adjustments on major legislative measures, one lobbyist
describes the drudgery of the work:
Toward the eafi of the session the day-to-day constant haunting
of the halls of Congress and office buildings of the members in order
to urge them to tak« a position on a critical vote is the . . . ip^T*j
I like the least. We always have such days of pressing legislative
work, especially on . . . bills toward the end of the session, and in
these urgent situations there is sometimes a shift in strategy, and
you need to contact the members and change what you told them the
day before, in these situations, months of work is at stake. You
also realize that the members of Congress are very busy and you
hate to prea& them for time, and yet you feel that you have got to
do everything that you can do. Perhaps it would not change the vote
one bit if 1 just sat up in my office and did nothing, and yet I feel that
X must go down and do everything I can,. *
Many members of Congress work intimately with lobbyists to
exert pressure on fellow members and to excite public sentiment in sup-
port of cesired policies. Some congressmen even store up good will with
lobbyists by holding hearings on bills that really hurt no likelihood of pass-
im
age, giving the lobbyist an opportunity to appear to defeat the bill. How-
ever, to preserve open communications channels to the decision makers,
the lobbyist must appear to be concerned with the public welfare in addition
Miibrath, The V ash ington Lobbyists , p. I £9.
*lbid.
, p. 2.13.
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to the advantage of his own group. The congressman'* shotgun in the
closet Is the threat of cutting the lobbyist's access, which can be used as
a sanction ta force the lobbyist to behave according to the congressman's
desires.
If Congressman John J. O'Connor (D-N. Y.) had taken the advice
he gave to lobbyists when he was in the House, there would be few lobby-
ists around today; nor would O'Connor have been successful in hU new
position as a legislative representative three years later. In 1936, he
delivered an impassioned speech from the floor:
1 have n<s>v*r seen any effect a lobbyist ever had in Washington,
but they arc, at the same time, a nuisance to members. They claim
to do what they never can do. ... In my opinion, the janitor of the
building has aa much influence as any lobbyist who ever appeared in
Washington. J
But some of the beet advice offered to the lobbyist on maximiadng
his influence was in the form of four basic rules presented by a lawmaker
during a Brookings Institution study:
1. They /the lobbyists,/ should know the facts of the situation
with which they're dealing.
2. They should be courteous ia all their discussions with
congressmen, whether these members happen to agree with them
or not.
3. They should know the opposition and the kinds of arguments
which are being advanced by the opposition.
4. They should stick to the facts. *
Crawford, The Pressure Boys, p. * Q .
2
Clapp, The Congressman, p. 179.

I •! o#t any major legislative battle, the lobbyist choose© trom
the direct -contact technique* described above an expertly inter weaves
them with another method, the indirect or ! ->ra**roota' technique.
Grassroots kobbyinft
Taking the issue to the people is one of the basic techniques used
by today's lobbyist. This indirect advance upon the congressman through
his constituency is commonly referred to as grassroots lobbying. The
lobbyist rarely has the capacity to exert pressure <m congressmen in the
sense oi coercing them, but he nevertheless can exercise a degree oi influ-
ence in a roundabout way. The massive* heavily financed grassroots cam-
paign is the trademark of the modern lobbyist, not the cash under the
table, " babes in the bedroom ' approach of his nineteenth-century
counterpart.
In 1950, the Buchanan Committee took note of the rapid increase
in the lobbyist's use of the grassroots approach:
What it {grassroots lobbying/ amounts to is this: Rather than
attempt to influence legislation directly, the pressure group seeks
to create an appearance oi broad public support for its aims, sup-
port which can be mobilised when the legislative situation demands
it. This process may bear little resemblance to the lobbying of
1389, but the intent behind it and the end results are unquestionably
the same; namely, to influence the determination of legislative
policy. J
The mobilised force in readiness referred to by Buchanan is firmly
endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce's Legislative Handbook:
U.S., Congress, House, General Interim Report, p. 29.
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Leaders of all .associations* -national, state , and local --
should be prepared to rally their memberships at a moment's
notice to support or oppose a given legislative issue. *
A lobbyist emphasised the importance of timing when considering the use
of force in readiness :
It is important to direct the legislative effort at the level where
a bill is. . . . When a subcommittee is considering a bill, it's use-
less to turn one's energies to the full committee, and it is too early
to alert the membership of the association to contact the entire
House. A great deal of effort is wasted and it even tends to dry up
possible sources of support if one pushes the wrong action at the
wrong stage and before the thing is ready to be voted on. In order
to avoid this, we withhold all bids for support until the proper time.
Occasionally we get caught short and have to send out five thousand
telegrams in a hurry to get the support rolling in, but this cost is
worth it to avoid wasting our efforts before the time is ripe. 2
Congressman Celler also noted the shift in lobbying tactics
toward the grassroots approach. 'Realisation that ultimate power to affect
legislation resides in the people has given new direction to pressure group
3
activities, which now seek to influence legislation by remote control.
Although not universally true* the most persistent motivation of
a congressman is to maintain and enhance his reelection possibilities.
The congressman who does not consciously or unconsciously strive for
this end will generally be ejected from the system* One congressman put
it this way:
Well, of course the views of the constituents are always upper-
most in the politician's mind. We jokingly make a distinction
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Legislative Han< -
book for Associations (Washington: Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, J 962), p. I*,
*Milbrath, The Washin&tou Lobbyists, p. 2)8.
5Celler, Preasure Groups , p. 8.

30
between a politician and a statesman, bat we are all politicians, too.
As statesmen, we are delegated to represent not only the views 01
our constituents but also their best interests. If we could count on
the people being properly informed, well then, their views would be
all that is accessary, but unfortunately that cannot always be counted
on.
l
Although the lobbyist does not have significant power at the polls,
he tries to demonstrate to the individual congressman that a particular
course of action will help him with his own constituency. If this direct*
contact approach is not successful, the lobbyist may seek alternative routes,
such as stirring up the public at the grassroots, to gain more effective
access to the lawmaker.
If the campaign contribution were the only effective way in which
cash was used to influence legislation, the hundreds of millions of dollars
spent on grassroots lobbying would be money wasted, but such is dot the
case. As the result of grassroots lobbying campaigns, the voice of the
voter, when orchestrated by the lobbyist into a mighty symphony of pres-
sure, can sound as loud in the ear of the legislator as the purring tones
of the campaign contributor.
Many lobbyists believe that mass -mailing campaigns are too
crude and have too many limitations to be effective. However, the Chamber
of Commerce feels that most congressmen depend upon letters for support
and guidance.
Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists, p. 334.
2
Deakin, The Lobbyists
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It is Important in a democracy that businessmen help keep
their Legislators informed on the probable effects of the proposed
legislation upon the economy in general and their specific industry
or profession.
The organisations that use them think of letters from the grassroots as a
reinforcing tactic to back up other methods oi communication. A lobbyist
from a different business group said, "We don't think mass mailings are
very effective. About twice a year we do have mass mailings but lt*s
mostly to keep the membership happy.
The evidence indicates that most congressmen do not feel they
are significantly influenced by mass mailings which they have reason to
believe were instigated by lobbyists. In most congressmen's offices, the
inspired pressure mail is segregated from the genuine mail, sod
acknowledged with a form-letter reply. This pressure mail is considered
to be a most untrustworthy manifestation of public opinion, and congress*
7~en will often vote against the weight of it. Other congressmen may be
only mildly irritated by the organised letter -writing campaigns and merely
discount the letters as an inaccurate reflection of constituent opinion and
the work of a lobbyist group. However, there does 9mem to be common
agreement among authorities that, "Considered singly, the letter-writing
campaign is probably the least effective and most relied upon lobbying
technique.
Chamber of Commerce, Legislative Handbook, p. 26.
I
Matthews, U.S. Senators and Thei r orld, p. 192.
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Closely a* in to the grassroots method are the techniques of
publicity an: propaganda, perfected in today's world of advertising, of
influencing public opinion through the mass distribution of books and pam-
phlets, lull-page advertisements in the newspapers and periodicals* and
other mass-media assaults. It has become a steady trend for lobbyists to
expend more oi their energy and resources in the hope ot creating a more
generally iavorable climate of opinion In the society as a whole. The
increased use of the mas*-media communication to reach the people faster,
more often, and in greater number* is perhaps the most significant recent
development in lobbying activity.
If the danger oi direct contact lobbying is that the balance ox
interests may be upset by private, exclusive arrangements, the danger of
1
indirect grassroots lobbying is distortion of the facts. And yet, while
the U.S. Supreme Court was upholding the constitutionality of the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act oi 1946 during the Harris* case in 1954, it
construed the law narrowly, eliminating its coverage of the grassroots
technique*
The Businessman as a Lobbyist
The U.S. Government is a multi-bUUon-doUar customer for
goods and services, making lobbying an important activity for today's
businessman. Another factor contributing to the influx of business
Deai in, The Lobbyists
, p. 194.
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lobbyists on the Washington scene has been the extension of federal regula-
tion oi business activity.
For many centuries, businessmen have welded themselves into
organisations when it appeared to them that they had a common interest
that could be furthered by collective action. The beginning ot the capital-
istic system in the late Middle Age* introduced the idea that the making of
a profit should be the iundamental motive underlying a business venture.
Since businessmen want to make money, It is reasonable that the achieve-
ment of a satisfactory mar&in of profit is a major purpose behind the for-
mation of associations of businessmen. These groups normally send
lobbyists to • aahlngton because a policy objective is in possible jeopar
Although no accurate tally of the number of business lobbyists is
available, the membership rolls oi the Washington Trade Association
executives could serve as an excellent lobbyist directory. Nearly all of
the business associations represent the industry before legislative com-
mittees when public action is desired or when public action threatens to
impinge unfavorably on association members. Not unlike labor, business
likes to be left alone except when it needs government help.
Taken in the aggregate, business groups are probably the single
most powerful pressure force, tending toward a conservative position on
most legislation. This observation by the Congressional GuarterlyService
Zelgler, Interest Groups in American Society, p. 93.
"Legislator* and the Lobby ists (Washington: Congressional Quar-
terly Service, 1965), p. IT.

correlates well with Milbratb's comment:
Republican* are signiiicantly more likely to believe unqualifiedly
that lobbying is healthy for our democracy. One can only speculate
that Democrat* are generally more concerned with reform and change
and may be lees inclined to give blanket approval to existing institu-
tions. l
There appears to be a basic explanation for business getting the
most out 01 the lobbying system. First, it can afford the best and the
most talent. Second, it knows precisely what it wants --freedom from
restraint, lower taxes, subsidies where possible, and big profits.
One highly respected liberal congressman described the influence
of the lobbyist groups in this way:
These pressure groups do complicate matters or Influence con*
gressmen more than just in the sense of how many battalions they
have at election time. Maybe this is a confession of my own weak-
ness, but if I receive a corporate or institutional position, it means
a little more to me than an individual representation. This Includes
the whole spectrum of interest groups, from the Chamber of Com-
merce and ItsVM to the more radical unions, although of course the
effect of the plea depends somewhat on the nature of the group making
it.*
The two leading business organisations --the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States and the National Association of Manufacturer»--
have been extremely influential in carrying on a high level of legislative
lobbying activities. Deakin, discussing these two organisations, described
the Chamber as the personification of the large institutionalised lobbying
Milbrath, The Waehinftt-m Lobbyists , p. 73.
2CUpp. The Cottgr,,.^. p. m.
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organization. The Chamber's grassroots effort* which it considers its
most effective lobbying technique, consists in part of the publication and
distribution of Nation's Business, Washington Report, and Congressionai
Action, the costs oi which are not reportable under the !<H& Federal
Lobbying Act, The Chamber would like to project a public image with a.
tone of statesmanship*-* consideration oi the interests oi the Nation as a
whole. However, this element i» noticeably absent from these publications.
The function of the Chamber <or any other like group) as a source
of legislative information is clarified in its own Legislative Handbook:
A businessman needs to be informed on how specific legislation
affects his business or is likely to affect it. In the face of growing
government control over business through legislation of various
kinds, the individual should be able to look to his national, state or
local association for information. Because of the complexity of the
ever-increasing amount of legislation it has become helpful for many
associations to put out a newsletter or bulletinMis Washington Report /
informing their members of legislative developments. *
Although legislative action in Congress is not the primary function
or purpose of most business associations, it is often an important part of
an association's program. These associations know that a forthright,
timely presentation of helpful facts and honest views before legislators is
necessary for success. The president of the Socony-Mobil Oil Company
of New York, A. L. Nickerson, explained a typical way that a business
association becomes involved in pending legislation:
Deakin, The Lobbyists
, p. 133.
2Chamber of Commerce, Legislative Handbook, p. 21.
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o have been extremely interested in federal legislation. W«
consider that each one of our director* has the obligation o£ being
generally informed of legislation that may be under consideration
by the Congress in that director's portfolio or area. However, the
primary responsibility for following legislation is in our office of
the general counsel. Our general counsel is assisted in carrying
out these responsibilities by two legislative representatives. His
office will customarily analyse any bUl which appears to be of gen-
eral interest to our company. He will refer that analysis to the
one or wore directors who may be interested, and together they
wilt decide whether or not there is any action that our company
should take with respect to a given bill. Xf they do so decide, that
action might take the form only of disseminating information to
interested people in the company. But if we have a stronger feeling
for or against such legislation, we might elect to have those views
expressed to a trade association, such as the Chamber of Commerce,
the National Association of Manufacturers, the Foreign Trade Coun-
cil, or other trade associations of that kind.
If we feel very strongly about legislation, as we did in the
Harris -Fuibrlght Act, we may take a somewhat greater interest in
the legislation, and in that case we could prepare witnesses for
appearance before committees, we could develop educational mate-
rial which we would make available to Congressmen, or we might,
as we have in some cases in the past, ask our legislative representa-
tives to communicate our views to certain Members of the Congress. *
These associations are responsible to their industry and the
economy on the whole to insure that Congress is amply provided with per-
tinent Information. The legislative committee (or other appropriate arm)
of an association studies and interprets the issues and informs and moti-
vates the association members to contact their legislators, either person-
ally or by means of correspondence, or both. It attempts to show the
legislators why they should act in accordance with the views of the industry,
Business management is developing a class of paid experts who, because
of their experience and technical knowledge of politics, are capable of
Senate, To Inv estigate- Political Activities, Hearings
, pp. 416*
417.

contacting the group's legislative affairs. However, a currant trend in
this area is placing the lobbyist in the role of a hired man who brings in
the president and vice presidents ol the organisation and coaches them on
the bill, so they can effectively appear before committee*.
Perhaps la response to the common accusation that some lobby
ists spend almost as much time lobbying their clients as they do lobbying
Congress, few businesses leave the sole responsibility for the promotion
and protection of their political interests to their respective associations.
Most oi the large corporations, and many of those not so great, retain
Washington law fiyma or other specialists as their legislative watchdogs.
V. O, Key, Jr. , Politics, Parties and Pressure groups (New
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1%4). p. 135.

CHAPTER IU
THE PRS-1946 LOBBYING ACT ERA
Congress shall make no law abridging . . . the
right of the people ... to petition the government
for the redress of grievances.
••First Amendment, U.S. Constitution
The right oi petition became part of the Constitution with the
adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791. The framers of the Constitution
felt that elective representation of the population in Congress was not
sufficient to satisfy the neecls and desires of society, which was viewed
mm an arena oi competition and conflict. A guaranteed right oi petition to
the government was *ieemm4 necessary, and is among the oldest of our
liberties.
The practice oi lobbying started a good three centuries ago,
when englishmen seeking special privileges from Members of Parliament
customarily gathered in the outer lobbies of the House of Commons . . .
Of course, it remained for the Americans to perfect and expand the prac-
tice into an institution.
The N ineteenth Century
Alexander Hamilton's Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of
National Industry, (ormtd in the early 13Q0 ( s, can claim credit as the
Stephen M. Young, The Case lor lobbies, Playboy, January,
1968, p. J7S.
M
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first business lobby initiated for the purpose of influencing legislation,
i-»ike today's Chamber oi Commerce of the United dtates, this group was
(interested in tariff legislation.
The classic era of lobbying in the United States was during the
Utter half of the nineteenth century. Throughout that period, lobbying
was characterised by the preservation and encouragement of private prop*
erty. In these years, ttse public at large was victimised by a few men who
prospered. The congressmen who accepted fees from business interests
were merely men of their times. The public appeared unconcerned that
these same congressmen were voting on legislation affecting these interests
In the rr.id-lSQO's, the changeover of the Nation's economy from
agricultural to industrial was accompanied by swarms of lobbyists descend*
lag upon Washington. The flamboyant era of blondes and boose and raids
on the national treasury was under way. Deakin explains how the nine-
teenth century businessman was running Congress:
The basis for the unrestrained lobbying of the nineteenth century
was the belief that anything business (meaning the rich) did was
quite all right, simply because it was business that was doin , it.
The government of the United States, in effect, existed solely to
serve private enterprise and to advance its interests. *
Samuel Colt employed typical nineteenth-century lobbying tactics
when he wanted to renew the patent on his revolver in 1854, He retained
one congressman on a $10, 000 contingent fee to Insure smooth sailing
Schriftgiesser, The Lobbyists
, p, 6.
Z
Deakin, The Lobbyists, p. 72.
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tar the renewal oi the Colt patent and supplied three charming female
spiritualists" for the enlightenment of other congressmen.
Most lobbyists were regarded by the rank-and-file members of
the Congress as pests' and it was not unusual lor a member to tear up
the calling card sent into the House or Senate chamber by a lobbyist
requesting a conference with the congressman.
Senator Young cites a nineteenth-century senator's solution to
the pesty lobbyists:
The influential Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, truly
a great U.S. Senator» was feeling the heat from lobbyists seeking a
profitable shipbuilding subsidy. To their surprise. Senator Benton
quickly agreed to help, But he pressed one condition: When all
vessels are finished, they will be used to take all such damned
rascals as you out of the country. !^
A fundamental point about lobbying is illustrated by the financial
panic of 105?: there was just as much lobbying in that time of economic
distress as in prosperous times. Private interests expected the people of
the United States to protect them In bad times as well as good. In fact,
the pressures for Federal Government aid alter the Panic of 1357 far
overshadows similar pump priming during the early days of the New Deal.
A direct ancestor of the 1946 lobbying law appeared in J 876, but
only for the Forty-fourth Congress, The House adopted Congressman
George F. Hoar's (ft-Mass) resolution providing:
Young, The Case for lobbies, p. 17$.
id.
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Resolved, that all persona or corporations employing counsel
or agents to represent their interests in regard to any measure
pending at any time before this House, or any committee thereof,
shall cause the name and authority of such counsel or agent to be
filed with the Clerk of the House; and. no person whose name end
authority are not so filed shall appear as counsel or agent before
any committee of this House. *
The close o£ the nineteenth ceotury saw the end of the heyday of
lobbying giants like Thurlow Weed and Sam Ward, who said, The way to
a man's Aye is through his stomach. The National Association of Manu-
facturers was formally organised in 109$. The early activities of the
NAM, which are inauspicious in comparison with that group's current
legislative program, were almost entirely concerned with the promotion
of trade and commerce. The NAM did not flourish with these goals, and
at the start of the twentieth century was regarded as something less than
3
a dynamic organisation.
The Twentieth Century
It is only fair that David Truman's assertion that "1903 marked
the beginning of a new organisation (tor NAM/ serves as an introduction
to the current century in which NAM stands as one of the two most Impor-
tant business associations la the United States today, NAM reoriented its
goals as formal recognition of the increasing activity of organised labor
i 2
Deakin, The Lobbyists
, p. 71. Ibid. , p. 6£.
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Zeigler. Interest Groups in ' nqrican society, p. lit,
David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 19S1), p. 31.
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(AFL), which had increased in membership Jrom lee* than 350.000 in
1895 to nearly i, 750.000 in 1903.
3
The first spectacular expose of lobbying was the New York insur-
ance investigation oi 1905, which led to the enactment of many state lobby-
control laws. However, the first of the mocera congressional lobby inves-
tigations had to await President Woodrow Wilson's complaint (only two
months alter he entered the White House) that lobbyists were making boodle
of the tariff laws in 1913. Wilson had previously exclaimed in one oi his
1912 campaign speeches that The masters of the government of the United
States are the combined capitalists and manufacturers oi the United
Z
States, Wilson's charges signaled the beginning of a series of congres-
sional investigations in lobbying activities, brought about partially by a
growing public concern for preserving the national legislative processes,
and partially because the lobbyists were beginning to realise that the old
and often corrupt ways of the past would no longer be tolerated,
Garrett Comm ittee
A June 29 article in the now-defunct New York World set off the
i i mum i in i " m imi
1913 lobbyist explosion. The article, a detailed account of the RAM's.
undercover activities In the Nation's capital, was signed by Martin M,
Mulhall, NAM's chief lobbyist since 1903, MulhaU's charges implicated
many officials anc members of Congress, resulting in Speaker James
eigler, Interest Groups in American Society, p. 112.
2
t-utgiesser, The Lobbyists, p. 35.
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(Champ) Clark's ffeef o. ) appointment of a Select House Committee, headed
by Majority Leader Finis J. Garrett (D-Tenn) to investigate the charges.
Crawford outlines a detailed record of an almost incredible history of
intrigue, intimidation, bribery, &nd solicitation by the NAM* s high-
jpressure lobbyists in the capital. In brief, the Garrett Committee estab-
lished that the NAM carried several congressmen and the chief page of the
House on Its payroll and allegedly influenced appointments to several
strategic committees.
The real backbone of the committee, Congressman vuiiam J.
ZMeEonald (P-Mich.), chilled the NAM in a separate minority report:
Their j^NAM'i/ plainly shown attitude was that the American
Congress was considered by them as their legislative department
and was viewed with the same arrogant manner In which they
viewed their other employees, and that those legislators who dared
to oppose them would be disciplined in the same manner in which
they were accustomed to discipline recalcitrant employees, *
Of the seven congressmen accused of being reached by NAM,
all but Congressman James T. McDermott {D-ttl, ) were exonerated by
the committee's findings. Although McDermott was proved to be deeply
Involved in Moihall's activities, he was not expelled. However, on July 21,
1914, McDermott resigned, a completely discredited legislator.
As a result of the Mulhall investigation, the first lobby-control
bill was introduced in Congress in a form similar to Hoar's 187© House
Crawford, The Pressure Boys , pp, 46-50.
g
Progressive Party fro?n Michigan.
3Crawford, The Pressure Boys, p. 49.
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resolution. Although the Mulhali case cast serious doubts on the ability
©* Congress to act Independently oi the lobbyist's influences, the House
version of the bill <iied in the Senate, A similar bill, introduced by
Senator Thaddeus B. Caraway (C »Ark. \ in I92S» was passed by the
Senate but received no action by the House,
Although tbe NAM has altered its tactics following the Mulhali
investigation, Cleveland's research -indicates NAM 1 * continued misfortunes
consisted oi opposing thirty-one of the thirty••eight major laws enacted
1
between J933 and 194W
iile Wilson was on the campaign trail, incumbent President
Tait was attending an April ZZ, 1 9 1$ meeting that established the mem*>
bership regulations (or the Chamber of Commtrtt of the Untied States.
T ait's interest in the Chamber is exclaimed in its current edition of
A Glimpee
_
of the >!atlonal Chamber , as follows:
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States was formed on
the recommendation of President William Howard Taft, who saw
the need for 'a central organisation to give Congress the benefit
of the thinking oi the business community my national problems and
issues affecting the economy.'
Harwood Childs 1 Uabor &&& Capital in National Politics is ccm*
sidered to be the authoritative account of the history of the Chamber, and
accurately describes its conception:
-~.
—... . ...„
Alfred S. Cleveland, ' NAM; Spokesman for Industry?'' Harvard
Business Review, XXVI<May, 1948), 35?,
ZChamber of Commerce of the United States, A GjUgrtpea- of the
' K i n i i miii imr urn
National Chamber (Washington: Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, 1967-19&S), p. 2,
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The Chamber idea seems to have taken place at an opportune
moment, and the wide publicity given to the undertaking, the quasi-
governmental endorsement of the move, the general feeling of
insecurity among a large number oi business interests during the
political upheaval in 1912- 5 913. . . served to facilitate somewhat
the early problems of recruiting.
Senator Hugo L. Black (L-AU, \ later to become a Supreme Court
Justice, was referring to the Chamber of Commerce, the NAM, and
hundreds of other trade associations when he warned the public in a 1935
radio speech that lobbying had reached such a position of power that it
threatens the government itself, its slate, its power, its capacity for evil;
its greed, trickery, deception, and fraud condemn it to the death it
deserves.
Black Investigation
In 1955, Senator Black was chairing a Senate committee investi-
gating lobbying by the utilities industry. This investigation won passage
of the Public Utilities Holding Company ct, which requires utilities
lobbyists to register with the Securities aud Exchange Commission.
Black's general lobbyist registration bill (3. 25 U), passed by
the Senate in 1935, applied to persons who engaged in lobbying to influence
departments oi the government as well as those engaged in legislative
Harwooc Child?,*, Labor and Capital in National Politics
(Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1930), p. 24,
Z
Deakin, The Lobbyists, p. 76,
3Congress and the Nation, p. 1549.
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lobbying. Meanwhile, the House was approving its version of the bill
(K. R. 11663), which applied only to persons engaged in lobbying before
I
Congress *or legislation. Although the conference report of H.R. 11663
considerably broadened the scope of the bill, the House defeated the con-
ference report in 1936. Congressman Howard *f . Smith (B*Va. ) is often
credited with the death of this bill by adding drastic amendments that
doomed any chances of passage. In the same year, Congress approved
another piecemeal registration act {the Merchant Marine Act) requiring
maritime lobbyists to register with the Secretary of Commerce,
lobbying is a type of activity that periodically demands that
Congress do something about it.
Decision makers realise that the unethical behavior of an occa-
sional lobbyist is by no means characteristic of the entire group;
therefore, they demonstrate righteous indignation publicly, start an
investigation, introduce reform bills, and wait for the public clamor
to die down. 2
Such was the legislative history of lobbying until the enactment of the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act in 1946.
The 1946 Acti n ii ii
A considerable portion of the testimony presented before the
Joint Committee on the Organisation of Congress during the Seventy-ninth
Congress concerned pressure from lobbyists. In its report (S, Report
1011) the Joint Committee stated:
^
Congressional Record , LXXX, No. 9 (June 17, 1936), p. 9752.
VUbrath, The Washington Lobbyists
, p. 317.
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Your committee heard many complaints during its hearings of
the attempts of organized pressure groups to Influence the decisions
of Congress on legislation pending before the two Houses or their
committees.
Recognising fully the lobbyist's right to petition Congress and the right to
free expression, the committee nevertheless declared that information
concerning lobbying groups could be made available without impairing such
rights. It therefore recommended!
. . . That Congress enact legislation providing for the registra-
tion of organised groups and their agents who seek to influence legis-
lation and that such registration include quarterly statements of
expenditures made for this purpose. *•
It continued:
Groups and employed individuals should be required to register
each session with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the
Secretary of the Senate and to submit under oath such pertinent data
as will clearly Indicate to the Congress the nature and extent of
their activities. Registration of individuals should be provided for
on uniform blanks in both Houses , stating by whom the agent is
employed, the period of such employment, his special subject of
legislative interest, and his compensation. &very three months
such individuals would be required to report and itemise under oath
any expenses incurred by themselves and by the organizations they
represent in promoting or opposing legislation, the purpose of tike
expenditures, and a list of the bills and resolutions promoted or
opposed. All information on registration and expenditures for influ-
encing legislation should be compiled by the clerks of the House and
Senate and be printed each quarter in the Congressional Record.
Registration of organisation* should include a statement of their
bona fide total membership and the amounts expended each quarter
for the influencing of legislation. Any contributor of money in
excess of $500 pur year would be required to be listed in the
registration.
I
U.S. , Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Con-
gress, 3. Rept. 3011, 79th Cong. , Ikj Ses*. , 1946, p. &6.
~lbld.
, p. 27.
3
Ibid.

The LaFoilette-V onroney Legislative Reorganisation Bill (S.2177),
presente I ingress on May 31, 1946, was accompanied by a carefully
worded report (Senate Report '400) which revealed the committee's sensi-
tivity towards possible criticism oi ita lobby provisions on constitutional
grounds. In an attempt to prevent any misunderstanding of the purposes of
Title IU, the committee made a statement as to what the title was intended
to do and what it was not intended to do:
It did not apply to the publishers oi newspapers, magazines, or
other publications, acting in the regular course of business.
It did not apply to person* appearing openly and frankly before
the committees of Congress and engaging in no other activities to
influence legislation.
It did not require any reports of any persona or organizations re-
quired to report under the provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act.
It did not apply to pardon* appearing voluntarily without compen*
sation.
It did not apply to organisations formed for other purposes whose
efforts to influence legislation were merely incidental to the purposes
for which formed. l
Title III applied chiefly, the report declared, to three distinct
classes of so-called lobbyists:
First. Those who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda
from all over the country in the form of letters and telegrams, many
of which have been based entirely on misinformation as to facts.
This class of persons and organizations will be required under the
title, not to cease or curtail their activities in any respect, but to
disclose the sources of their collections and the methods in which
they are disbursed.
Second. The second class oi lobbyists are those who are
employed to come to the Capitol under the false impression that they
exert some powerful Influence over members of Congress. These
individuals spend their time in Washington presumably exerting
U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on the Organisation
of Congress, S. Kept. 1400, to accompany S. 2177, 79th Cong. , 2d5ess, t
1946, pp. 26-27.

•ome mysterious influence witl r spect to the legislation in which
their employers are interested* but carefully conceal from member*
of Congress whom, they happen to contact the purpose of their pres-
ence. The title in no wise prohibits or curtails their activities, ft
merely requires that they shall register and disclose the sources and
purposes of their employment an & the amount of their compensation.
Third. There is a third class of entirely honest and respectable
representatives of business, professional, and philanthropic organi-
sations who come to Washington openly and frankly to express their
viaws for or against legislation, many of whom serve a useful and
perfectly legitimate purpose in expressing the views and interpreta-
tions o: their employers with respect to legislation which concerns
them. They will likewise be required to register and state their
compensation and sources of their employment. *
It seems significant that the legislative history of the La Foilette
Committee hearings does not indicate that the investigations singled out
lobbying for particular study. The committee seemed content to accept
testimony concerning lobbying in the course of general discussion of other
elements of the Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1946.
The Constitutional provision that Congress cannot abridge the
right of the people to petition the Government has limited the legislature
in passing laws regulating or controlling lobbies and lobbyists. This right
to petition means that no citizen can be restrained from belaboring Con*
gress with demands for the passage or defeat of legislation, whether the
demands are reasonable or unreasonable ^nd whether they are in the inter-
est of the public welfare or for the betterment of private and selfish ends.
The difficult and delicate task is to r«ach the real evils of lobbying without
cutting into real and substantial constitutional rights and without putting an
Ibid.
, p. |?«
Schriftgiesser, The Lobbyiat»
y
p. 80,
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to all the beneficial contributions made by lobbyists to tho national
legislative process.
Congress attempted to regulate the lobbying activity by passing
the federal Regulation of Lobbying Act as Title III of the Legislative
Reorganization Act oi 1946 (60 Stat. 839), which became the law of the
land on August 2, 1*46. Key wrote:
An old maxim of American political reform is that publicity is
a powerful corrective of wrong-doing. If lobbyists work openly, the
reasotdng goes, their animus* will be known to all and both legisla-
tor and public will be protected, '
The 1946 law undoubtedly has forced many behind -the*scene legislative
lobbyists Into public view. The goal of this (or any) lobbying law Is not
to prohibit or control the activities of lobbyists but to educate--*© publicise
what interests are at work. Some enterprising lobbyists are even known
to use registration to become known and to attract clients I
A quarterly public listing of registered lobbyists in the
Congressional Record is perhaj»s the most reasonable means of identifying
lobbyists, without resorting to the powers of an agency such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Intended as a disclosure measure, it was pat-
terned after bills considered by both Houses in the Seventy-fourth Congress
(S. 2512; H,R, 11663).
The theory behind such /disclosure? regulation is that if vital
information concerning lobbies U made a matter of public knowledge,
the people will be able to evaluate the propriety of the pressures
which are brought to bear upon government officers, in particular,
Kev » Politics, Parties^ and Pressure Groups, p. IS!
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it is hoped that legislators will thereby be able to resist pressures
which in the past they have submitted to because of fear that public
opinion would not support them if they ^tood their ground.
Although Dr. Belle teller's comments on the Imperfect birth
of the 1946 Act hold true today, it did afford for the first time in the his*
tory of Congress a documented partial picture of the Washington lobby
scene* Dr. teller wrote:
The lobbying provisions [&i the H46 Act/ gave clear evidence
of heavy dependence upon several bills of earlier Congresses which
failed to be passed and were of hasty and careless draftsmanship.
Small wonder that compliance was faulty. 2
The hasty and careless draftsmanship ' of the 1946 Act has been
the subject of numerous judicial interpretations and congressional queries
(hiring its brief 21 -year history. Rather than listing the many loopholes
that presently exist in the Act* the writer has chosen to present the perti-
nent events that unveiled these loopholes.
1
Edgar Lane, Lobbying and the Law <Lo» Angeles: University
of California Press, 1964), p. 184.
2
Beile Zeller, TheJRej^uiat^^
Vol 319 of Unofficial Governmental*^ p. 93.

CHAPTER IV
THE. POST -1946 LOBBYING ACT £RA
A* we no longer ceXine an airplane a* what the
Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk, we can no
longer ceiine lobbying a* what Sam Ward did
during the Grant administration. *
-- Edgar Lane
Judicial interpretations
Although the 1946 Act doe* not provide for an enforcement agency,
the Department oi Justice made its first and only attempt at administering
and policing the Act in late 194?. Tom C. Clark, the Attorney General at
that time, who was later to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court* set up a special lobbying unit headed by Special Assistant Attorney
General Irving R. Kaufman. This unit reviewed copies oi all lobbying
registrations and reports, investigated alleged violations of the lobbying
law, and saw to it that those who were required to register did so. Only
898 lobbyists of the thousands known to be active had made the required
registrations at the time.
During the five-year life oif Kaufman's lobbying unit, three court
decisions were rendered. The major case involved singling out NAM as
not complying fully with the lobbying law and requesting it to submit a
Lane, Lobbying and the Law, p. 11,
52
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more complete account of its receipts and expenditures, NAM, an oppo-
nent of the lobbying law from its enactment, complied with Kaufman**
request and then filed a test *uit for a declaratory judgment in the U.S.
District Court for the District o£ Columbia (NAM v. McQrath).
•««•• Ill II 1 1 I l«W««WI
NAM y. McGrath (1952) *
The court ruled that the financial disclosure requirements of the
Lobbying Act, including .Section 307, were unconstitutional. Sections 303
and 307 were held invalid as contravening the due-process clause of the
Fifth Amendment in failing to define the offense with sufficient precision
and to set forth an ascertainable standard of guilt. The wording to
influence, directly or Indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation
by the Congress" was deemed to cover too many undefined yet possible
activities, thus denying in advance a determination of what activities
could be comprehended within its scope. The a&me reasoning was applied
to the term principal purpose in the Act.
The court also noted that the penalty prohibiting any lobbying
activities for a period of three years after a conviction for violation of
Section 310 was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the right of free speech
and to petition the Congress.
But when the ruling reached the Supreme Court, on an appeal by
the Department of Justice, the high court overruled the district court on
#M —— -—
I
National Association of Manufacturers v. MeGtath (D. C. D.C. ),
103 F. Supp. 510 (!952).

Mthe technical point that Clark, the defendant* had resigned hi* office and
had been replaced by J. Howard McGrath. The Lobbying Act remained in
effect, but open to further challenge.
The other two cases involving the 1946 Lobbying vet had been
decided prior to the NA*£ v. M.cQrath case and are discussed below,
I
U.S. y. U. 3, Savings and Loan League ( ,1949)
A motion to dismiss an indictment under the Lobbying Act on the
ground that the three count* thereof were not sufficiently detailed to con-
stitute a valid charge against the defendant was sustained. An information
was substituted thereafter, and it too was later dismissed at the request
of the Government since the defendant had, subsequent to the date of the
indictment, complied with the Lobbying Act.
U.S. v. Slaughter 0950)*
A motion to dismiss another Indictment was denied on the grounds
that the government** bill of particulars stated that it intended to prove
that, in order to influence, the defendant had contacted congressmen and
was present at certain sessions of Congress. The court could not decide
without additional evidence whether the activity of the defendant fell within
the purview of the statute.
;iMHump i|u i ww.^-^tw*»^rmww.v'*-*°^ mm*
U.S. v. U.S. Savings ant! Loan League (D. CD. C), 9 F. R.D.
450 (1949).
2
U.S. v. Slaughter (D.C.I?. C. ). 89 F, Supp* 205, 89 F. Supp.
876 (1950).
Roger C. Slaughter was a Democratic congressman from Mis-
souri from 1943-1947 and a bitter political foe of then-President Truman.
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The defendant argued that the Lobbying Act wan unconstitutional
because it was 00 vague and uncertain as to tail to MkMt due-process
requirements ami because it otlendac! the First Amendment. He also con-
tended that he merely (I) aided witnesses who testified before committee
Mrf (*•) iMtHM himself* both of which activities were exempted from the
Act.
The court's ruling declared that the requirements of the Act were
a reasonable exercise of the powers of Congress an*x did not violate the
if irwt Amendment. However • the defendant was found not guilty of vio-
lating the ct for jailing to register, since the evidence showed only that
Slaughter's activities cuoslated largely of preparing statements for wit*
uessea to be given by them before congressional committees. The gov
eromeut's accusations that the defendant had personally contacted mem*
bars in connection with legislation were not proven.
In i9t>S, another case (U*a« v. Rumeiy) defined the term
lobbying activities' in a narrow sense and laid the groundwork for a
similarly narrow construction in the later case of U.S . v. Harrises, con-
sidered a landmark Judicial interpretation of the 1946 Lobbying vet.
U.S. v. Rumely (J 95^
Rumeiy was charged with contempt of Congress for refusing to
disclose certain information to the House Select Committee on Lobbying
*U.$. v. Rumeiy. M5 U.S. 41 (1953).
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(the Buchanan committee). Specifically, the committee had asked the
names of those who made bulk purchases of books by the Committee for
Constitutional Government, oi which the defendant was secretary, for fur-
ther distribution. A decision by the court of appeals reversing a convic-
tion o» the defendant was affirmed.
The court held that the Houee Resolution <H. R. 298, IMst Con-
gress), creating the Select Committee, could not be construed as autho-
rizing It to inquire into all efforts if private individuals to Influence public
opinion through books and periodicals, however remote th-s radiations of
influence that they may exert upon the legislative process. The court
reasoned that doubts of the constitutionality of «uch authorization would be
raised in view of the guarantees of the First Amendment.
The court held that the phrase "lobbying activities used in the
authorising resolution related to lobbying in its commonly accepted
sense --that is, representation made directly to the Congress, its mem-
bers, or its committees --and it could not be construed to reach attempts
to saturate the thinking of the community.
U.S. v. Harries (If54)
*
The Lobbying Act finally reached the Supreme Court in 1954 in
the test case or U.S. v. Harris s. Deakin provides the case background:
The defendants in the case vmra Robert M. Harries, a New
York cotton broker; Ralph W. Moore, a Washington commodity
trader; James £. McDonald, agriculture commissioner of Texas;
- -
—
l
U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 412(1954).

Tom Linder, agriculture commissioner oi Georgia; and the National
Farm Committee, a Texas corporation. They rvere charger: with
attempting to influence the passage of agriculture legislation without
registering or reporting unoer the Loooytng ^ct. in orcter to test
t\ r i-HV-ri j »- rri:--* V.?.t* refur.r-* *3 • ' r-aisad
money to lobby for farm price supports. The Ju* f.ic« Department
icf~~-»nt^ char.?e;< ttlftl H&rri- : nuuil pftytVMMitf to MtttMhti who
was secretary of the National Farm Committee, for the purpose of
pressuring Coniire^s tyn begifttftttent, nru\ i.x . > similar
payments to McDonald and Linder, all without registering as
lobbyists. *
ThU esse tafl»§i an appall by the jevfrnmeni of a dismissal by
triet Court *4 tfct Usite-i UNUt for the \ t-ict el Colombia os a
criminal ^ronecutlon alleging violators by the defendants of the Lobbying
A rt. The luvcr court' 5 action had l>e?»n based on a holding that several
tions of the Act w*ro unconstitutional as a criminal statute.
By a 5 to 3 decision (one justice not participating), the Supreme
Court aHr«ad that tl»* Act fti written sought to bring within its scope activi-
ties which, under the First Amendment to the Constitution, are beyond the
reach of congressional control or inquiry. Instead oi holding the entire
Act to be invalid, however, the molarity of the Court undertook to define,
interpret, and delimit it. In effect, the Court revised the Act's language
and, as »o interpreted, declared its requirements constitutional.
This approach led to vigorous criticisms by the dissenting
justices. Justice Robert H. Jackson, in hie dissenting opinion, wrote:
The clearest feature 01 this case is that it begins with an Ad
so mischievously vague that the Government chargsd with Its
enforcement does not uncerstand it, for some of its important
ft—Irtag Th* Lobbyists, p. <U-5.
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atsumption* arc rejected by the Court'* Interpretation. The clearest
feature of the Court's decision U that it leaves the country under an
Act which is not much like any Act passed by Concrete. Of course,
when such a question U before ud, it is easy to differ at to whether it
ie more appropriate to strike out or to strike ciovn. But I recall few
cases in which the Court has gone so far in rewriting an ct.
I think we should point out the defects and limitations which condemn
this Act so clearly that the Court cannot sustain it as written, and
leave its rewriting to Congress.
In a dissent concurred in by Justice Hugo i* Black, Justice
William O. Douglas expressed the conviction that;
The formula adopted to save this Act is too dangerous to use.
It can easily ensnare people who have done no more than exercise
their constitutional rights of speech, assembly, and press.
Tho dangerous formula included two important points. The
Court decided (1) that lobbying subject to the Act includes only direct com-
munication with Congress and (Z) that a person (which includes an associa-
tion or other form of organisation) must be covered by the requirements of
Section 307 before he incurs any registration or reporting responsibility
under other sections of the Act.
Since the Supreme Court's interpretation in effect rewrote Section
307, a determination as to whether a person is covered by the Act cannot
be made by reference solely to the language of that Section as originally
enacted by Congress. The Court summariaed the prerequisites to cover-
age as follows:
1. The person must have solicited, collected, or received
contributions.
2. One of the main purposes of such person, or one of the
main purposes of such contributions, must have been to influence
the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress.
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3. The intended method of accomplishing this purpose muit
have been through direct communication with members of Congress,
All of the above conditions must exist before a person falls within
the scope of Section 307. If any one of the conditions is missing, a person
is not covered.
Analysis of Harris* Case
No problem of further interpretation is presented by the first
point—by definition of the Act, the term "contributions" is so broad as to
include all forms of payment of money or anything of value, including
agreements to make a contribution, even if not legally enforceable.
In determining whether a person is covered by the Act, it is
necessary, however, to ascertain what activities are covered by the phrase
direct communication with members of Congress 1 and what is meant by
a main purpose.
"
"Direct communication with members of Congress is construed
narrowly. In the opinion of U.S. v. Rumely, language similar to that of
Section 307 was held to encompass ''representations made directly to the
Congress, its members, or lis committees. " That opinion emphasised
that such language does not reach attempts to saturate the thinking of the
community. Had the Court dapped with the reference to the Rumely case.
It might have averted some confusion. It went on, however, to indicate
that "direct communication with members of Congress' Includes direct
pressures, exerted by the lobbyists themselves or through their hirelings
or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign.
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The net effect is to make it clear that the scope of this Act dQ9B
not induce form* of general publicity, such as dissemination of informa-
tion relating to legislation through publications, press releases, broad-
casts, and similar media. The fact that viewpoints are expressed, or that
the publicity is designed to influence opinion, is not sufficient to bring such
materials within the scope of the Act where there is no direct request that
communications be sent to Congress supporting views expressed,
Likewise, a letter or statement to Congress or a committee of
Congress expressing the viewpoint of an organisation on legislation is con-
sidered direct lobbying. Between these two categories m communications,
however, a twilight zone is created. Obviously, many communications
or publications relating to national issues fall into this uncertain area,
The concept of direct lobbying appears to cover testimony and
other statements presented or sent to congressional committees. Senate
Reports 10 il and 1400, and the fact that Section 30$ (relating to registra-
tion and reporting) is specifically inapplicable to any person who merely
appears before a committee ... in support of or opposition to legisla-
tion, have led to a general belief that testimony is not covered by the Act.
Section 507, in designating persons to whom the Act applies, does not con-
tain any exemption such as that of Section 308. Further, Section 305
(which specifies certain reports to be made or contributions and expendi-
tures) contains no such exemption.
The questions of applicability, then, follow: Has the person
solicited or received contribution*'.' Has he engaged in some direct
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lobbying activity? Is the activity of efficient significance to bring the
person under the Act? Here again, the Court's opinion in the Par r tee case
leaves multipurpose organization* <i. e. , Chamber of Commerce) in a state
of uncertainty.
The summary of prerequisites to coverage umier Section 307
refers to one of the main purposes. Since this is a summarization,
reference must be made to the discussion in the opinion of the meaning of
the language 'the principal purpose and to be used principally to aid" as
contained in Section 307. Thus, the term "principal ' excludes from the
scope of Section 307 those contributions and persons having only an
IncjWental purpose o* influencing legislation. The term is construed to
rtlmt to a contribution which in substantial part Is to be used If influence
legislation through direct communication with Congress, or with a person
whose activities in substantial part are directed toward influencing legis-
lation through direct communication with Congress.
It should be kept in mind during further discussions of the Act that
contributions or expenditures required to be reported are restricted to
those items falling within the scope of direct lobbying, ' and exempt those
persons conducting indirect or grassroots campaigns. "The majority
opinion said that members of Congress must be able to evaluate such
/grassroots/ pressures, to put them in perspective, and then took away
the chief means of doing so.
Dea; in, The Lobbyists
, p. 232,

uU.S. v. Neff Q95fr>
This ca«« it the only successful prosecution under the Lobbying
Act during its ZS -year lite. It involved two attorneys, John Neff and Elmer
Fatrnan, employed to influence the passage of the Natural Gas ct. The
charge against Neff ami Patman was that they had failed to register as
lobbyists. Their employer, Superior Oil Company of California, was
accused of aiding and abetting their failure to register. The case concerned
a campaign contribution of $£» $00 which Neff tried to give to the late Senator
Francis H« Case (R-3. D.) while the Senate was considering the Harris*
Fulbright Natural Gas BUI, In 19S&, Superior Oil was fined $10,000 and
Neff and Patman were fined $2, S00 each an . given suspended one*year jail
sentences after the oil company and the two lawyers pleaded guilty of vio-
lating the Lobbying Act. The great furor over the Case episode and the
Senate investigation that followed, motivated President Eisenhower to
veto the Harris -Fulbright Bill, even though he favored it.
Congressional Investigation.!
r iiM ii nu .m i. , ,m in ni i in i i.« i 'i |>W ii
In February, 1943, the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments held a five-day public hearing for the purpose of
evaluating the Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1946. The Committee
*U.S. v. Neff (D.C.D.C). Criminal No. 768-56(1956)
(unreported),
2
Senator Walter F. George's (D-Ga.) Select Committee for Con-
tribution Investigation conducted hearings relative to 3, R. 205.
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chairman, Senator George F. Aiken (R-Vt. ), invited Dr. Belle ZeUer to
testify as to the workability of Title lit. Dr. teller presented eight
1
recommendations for the committee*® consideration, but the committee
chose to make no move toward strengthening Title ill.
This lack of action by the Aiken committee provided President
Truman with some powerful ammunition for the Presidential campaign of
1948. While lobbying activities were continuing unabated. President
Truman declared that the Eightieth Congress:
. | . was the most thoroughly surrounded « • • with lobbies in the
whole history of this great country of ours. There are more
lobbyists in Washington* there was more money spent by lobbyists
In Washington, than ever before in the history of the Congress of
the United States. It's disgraceful . . 2
When the Democratic •controlled Eighty-first Congress met in
January, 1949, Senator Harley M, Kiigore (D-W. Va.) introduced a reao*
iution calling for a comprehensive investigation of lobbying. However, the
Senate was in no hurry to investigate lobbying, so it was up to Congressman
Frank Buchanan (D*P&, ) to introduce a similar resolution, which was sub*
sequent!y passed by the House on May IS, 1949.
The Buchanan Committeei n — .!«... -.— ni .i hum i i mm. I
The House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, commonly
referred to as the Buchanan committee, was created pursuant to House
Schrlftgiesser, The bdbbyi;ats
, p. UO.
M. B. Schnapper, eri. , The Truman_ Program? Addressee ana
Messages by President Barry S. Truman (Washington: Public Affairs
Press, 1949). p. 196.
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Iveaolution 293 of the Eighty -first Congress, first session. This commit*
tee conducted the moat comprehensive investigation of lobbying in the his-
tory of Congress. Its membership consisted of four Democrats and three
Republicans. They included Chairman Frank Buchanan, Henderson Lanh&m
(D-Ga.), Cari Aibert p-Okla.), and Clyde Doyle (P-Caiif.); Charles A,
Kalleck (R-lnd. ), Clarence J. Brown <R- Ohio), and Joseph P. O'Hara
(R-Mlnn. ). Incidentally, the Committee's General Interim Report and its
Report and Recommendations on th^ Federal Lobby ing Act were approved
by a 4 to 3 vote, with all members voting straight party lines.
The majority of the committee viewed the 1946 Lobbyteg Act as
a well-intentioned first step which should be strengthened and made more
effective. It also noted that this was the first ti-ne a congressional inves-
tigation of lobbying activities had been conducted within the context of a
going system of registration.
The Report, and Recommendations^ on the. Federal Lobbying Act
(Report 3239) emphasised:
The Lobbying Act does not regulate lobbying in any vay, but
merely requires public disclosure of lobbying activities and the
identity of those who finance efforts to influence legislation, *
Committee members considered the right of petition to be an essential
guarantee under our constitutional system of representative government.
U.S., Congress, Mouse, Select Committee on Lobbying Activi-
ty* » Report and Recommendations on Federal Lobbying Act, Report 3239.
Parti, 8 1st'Cong. , 2d Sees/, 1950, p. 14,
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At the conclusion of its two-year investigation o£ lobbying, the
committee proposed a eerie* of amendments to the Lobbying Act. It
recommended changing the name oi Title 111 to the Legislative Interests
Reports Act; exempting radio and television broadcasting from coverage;
eliminating the fine or imprisonment provisions; and requiring less detail
in the required reports. These recommendations were submitted to the
House in the form of a Report on January 1, 1951., and since the NAM v.
McG rath case was still pending at the time, the report recommended that
no bills incorporating these amendments be introduced until after the
determination of that case.
Although the committee noted a rapid increase in the use of
grassroots techniques, they made no recommendations in this regard, as
the Lobbying Act would still cover grassroots pressure until the U.S. v.
Herrlee decision three years later.
In their Minority Report, submitted as Part I oi Report 3239,
Congressmen Haileck, Brown, and O'Hara decried the fact that the accom*
plishments of the committee had fallen far short of the important and
desirable purposes underlying the creation oi' the committee. They
sharply criticised ths Democratic members and pointed out several factors
that had definite political overtones. First, of the 173 organizations bom-
barded with the committee's detailed questionnaire, only five labor organi-
sations were queried. Secondly* the critics contended that Roger W. Jones
'ibid., pp. 29-3').
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(then .Assistant I irector. Bureau o; the Budget) was called as a witness to
set the stage for a co> plete whitewash oi lobbying by government agencies
Lastly, the tr ing of the release o: the various co ittee reports ca e
under attack fro*, the inority members. The cor ittee document
"Expenditures by Corporations To Influence Legislation and Report 3239
were released to the public in late October, 1950, about two weeks* prior
to the November elections. The document Expenditures by Labor am.
Fart Groups To Influence Legislation was not released until after the
November elections. The Minority Report also contained copies of the
bitter correspondence that was exchanged between the Minority members
and Chairman Buchanan, leading up to the rather unusual'* maimer of
releasing the co ittee' s findings and recommendations.
Although the Buchanan committee's recommendation* did not
result in a modification of the 1946 Lobbying Act, the conduct of th* com*
mittee'c activities clearly illustrates that any investigation of lobbying
is, in many respects, an investigation oi Congress itself. Lobbying is a
practice too close to the legislative function tor Congress to be able to
examine it with the proper perspective.
cC leilan Committee
Asa result of the 1956 natural gas scandal, Senator Walter F.
George (D-Ga. ) conducted an investigation of the $2, 500 campaign offer to
Schriftgieefier, Th« Lobbyists
, p. U9.
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Senator Case. Senator John L. ><cClellan (i)-\rk. ) was assigned the
chairmanship of a Senate committee to study political activities and cam*
palgn contributions in conjunction with lobbying.
The Senate Special Committee w&i appointed on February 23,
1956, by the then Vice President, Richard M. Nixon, and Senator McCleilan
issu? t the following challenge to the committee's membership:
. i . We have a job here as a committee, a§ 1 see it, to try to
bring completely to light the nature an*i character of activities
which generally prevail today with respect to what some term
lobbying.
The right to petition includes the right to lobby. The only con-
cern I have is that 1 want lobbying open and above board so everybody
will know it lor what it is. In other words, we don't want other pres-
sure* in connection with the legitimate right to petition. We don't
want those applied, those that might be regarded as corrupt, such as
may have precipitated this whole inquiry at this time, and any other
practices that would not be proper or lair or just in undertaking to
persuade or influence legislators.
If we find any, *re want to expose them and determine how to
deal with them. The right to petition, the right of constituents, the
right of any American to contact a Member of the Congress of the
United States, and express his views on legislation or issues that
are pending before the country, 1 think, is one which must be
preserved. 1
The McCleilan Committee recommended adoption of a "Legisla-
tive Activities Disclosure Act (S. 2191) in its final report (No. 395) of
May 31, 1937. The McCleilan bill would have tightened several loopholes
in the 1946 Lobbying Law by eliminating the principal purpose criterion
and designating the Comptroller General to administer the Act. But per-
haps even more importantly, Senator McCleilan' s bill provided for
To Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign
Contributions, Hearings, p. 428.
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disclosure of grassroots lobbying costs under certain circumstances.
Senator McGlellan had Indicated a concern for the disclosure of grassroots
costs during the committee hearings:
I can appreciate* and I think we all agree^ that there has been a
measure of confusion as to what the present (J 946/ act really covers,
what activities it covers, and what it does not cover. But if there is
any such thing as lobbying, in other words, unless that is a useless
word with no meaning at all in practical application, these /grass*
roots/ activities, in my judgment, would be at least a form of lobby*
ing. 1 am not saying it is something that should be made illegal, i
am not passing judgment on that at this time. 1 am not saying that it
is an activity that should be furtherjregulated^ But if the term
lobbying does not include these /grassroots^/ campaigns, to influ-
ence the vote of Members of Congress, then 1 don't know what prac-
tical interpretation you could place on the term lobbying. *
Senator McCiellan's bill was never afforded a hearing on the Senate
floor and consequently not in the courts. It met strong resistance from
the Chamber of Commerce, NAM, and others, and died with the end of the
Eighty-fifth Congress.
Joint Committee on th«
Organisation of the Congress
This Joint Committee was established by a concurrent resolution
(S. Con. Res. 2) during the first session oi the Eighty-ninth Congress,
and was co-chaired by Senator A.&. Mike Monroney (I3-Okla.) and
Congressman Kay Madden (D-Ind. ). Although the committee conducted
four sessions of hearings in June, 1965, only onm witness (Neil Pierce of
Congressional Quarterly Service)was invited to testify on lobbying laws.
Ibid.
, pp. £46-i>17.
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The committee was not authorised to report out a legislative bill and
expired as a body on December lt« 1967. Its final report (Senate Report
1414), issued July 2$. 1966, contained several recommendations concern-
ing the regulation of lobbying that were to be incorporated at a later date
by a special committee of the Senate.
- ;ate pecial Committee on
the Inanimation of the Congress
This committee was formed pursuant to the provisions ol Senate
Resolution 293, Eighty-ninth Congress, second session, and was chaired
by Senator Monroney. It incorporated the recommendations of Senate
Report 1414 and held public hearings over a live -month period to obtain
the views ol i99 witnesses, including 506 members of Congress. How-
ever, the committee indicated little interest in receiving testimony on the
regulation oi lobbying and Title V of the bill <S. 35$) was not attached until
the last week of the Hearings, perhaps as an afterthought. The committee
reported out Senate Report )., to accompany the Legislative Reorganisation
Act of *967 {&. 355) curing the first session, Ninetieth Congress.
ti§, Discus seo in more detail in the following chapter, proposed the
establishment oi a Joint Committee on Congressional Operations. In addi-
tion, it designated the Comptroller General as the enforcement agent of
the lobbying regulation provisions of Title V of the bill.

CHAPTER V
REFORMS AND R£M£DI£$
We should improve the process of
democracy ... by tightening our laws
regulating lobby
i
• • President Lyndon B. Johnson
State at the Union Message
January 10, 1967
Although the U.S. Supreme Court found the I94fc Lobbying Act
constitutional, several loopholes in the provisions of the Act have become
apparent during its 2! -year history. The Act has been interpreted to
exem.pt many organisations having obvious legislative interests. Every
person engaged in legislative activity is free to decide whether to register
timer the Lobbying Act, and, it registered, how much money to report as
having been spent on lobbying.
There has been a general downward trend in the amount of lobby
spending reported to Congress since 1950* This trend is normally attrib-
uted to the Slaughter and Harris* court cases in *950 and !954, respec-
tively. NAM stopped registering as an organisation in 1950, an! the
Chamber of Commerce followed suit in 19&4. The following table lists
the Congressional Quarterly Service's computation of lobby spending
NAM and the Chamber of Commerce have continued to report a
portion ol their spending by individuals in their organizations registered
as lobbyists.
70

72
figures for selected years reported to the Clerk of the House under the
1946 Lobbying \ct.
TABLE
LOBBY SPENDING FOR SKL£CT£D YCAR3
Year
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1956
1959
3960
1961
1962
1963
1965
1966
Groups Reporting
iii
269
216
!9?
225
264
230
239
312
304
2S6
304
296
Total Amount Spent
$ 7, 969. 7 10
10, 303. 204
«, 771, 097
4,823,931
4,445,841
4,236, 153
3.9S7. 120
4,201,468
3,854,375
3. 936, 096
4,211,304
4,223,605*
5,484,413
4,656.372
(
b
Congress and the Nation, 1945*1964, p. 1593.
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XXII (Washington: Congree-
eional Quarterly Service, J967), p. 1346.
CO Guide to Current American Government (Washington: Con-
gressional Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 312.
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The *9&5 spending figures was the highest lor any yea?? since 195 i,
primarily because of the unusually large sj;pe»diture--$l, )55, 93S--by the
American Medical Association in its unsuccessful fight against passage of
edicare.
Lobbying ha« often been character leen ass an iceberg with only the
tip showing. Actually* this characterisation is inadequate because, of the
vast amount of money spent each year in the United States to influence
legislation, only a relatively small amount is disclosed to the public and
the Congress. Thua, not much of even the tip is visible. "The Washing-
ton telephone directory Hats nom% 1,200 trade, business, and professional
associations and more than 100 national labor organisations with offices*
in the Nation's capital. " Only 29& of these organisations filed lobbying
reports in 196e.
Of the many men and organisations whose work brings them into
the legislative arena in one way or another, only a few register under the
1946 /<ct. Two prominent Washington organisations that do not register
are Hill and Knowlton, a public relations firm that conducts large -scale
grassroots campaigns, and the law firm oi Clifford and Miller. Peakia
quotes a Clifford and filler associate as explaining that the law firm does
3
not register because it does not "communicate with Congress in any way. M
Deakin, The Lobbyists
, p. 54.
Clark McAdams Clifford was sworn in as the Secretary of
I efenae on March !, ?96S.
3
Deakin, The Lobbyists, p. ?73.
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Hill and Knowiton, Clifford and Miller, and many other organiza-
tions use the absence of the communicative function as an excuse for not
registering under the 1946 Act. Most of these organizations insist that
their only function is to inform their home offices or clients on the status
of legislation, and that they do not attempt to influence the passage or
defeat of specific bills.
The vague definitions in the 1*W6 Lobbying Act, to be «f:i»cua aed
next, permit the lobbyist a great deal of discretion in deciding whether to
list his activities an^ expenditures.
Loopholes in the Act
The three major loopholes in the 1946 Lobbying Act concern the
varied interpretations of "direct communications 5 ' and principal purpose
and the Act's failure to designate an agency or official to administer and
enforce the law.
Direct Communication
-i i i ' "i i
The Supreme Court made it clear in the Harrias case that general
information about legislation, such as that contained in publications, press
releases, and other grassroots devices, is not covered by the Act. On the
other hand, the Court's rulings covered communications in which "repre-
sentations are made directly to the Congress, its members, or its
committees.
After making this clear distinction, the Court went on to muddy
the waters somewhat by including in direct communications direct
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pressures* exerted by the lobbyists themselves or through their hirelings,
or through en artificially stimulated letter campaign*
Between the two basic categories oi communications, a twilight
zone has been created. Many grassroots communications and publications
sail into this uncertain area. This situation has worsened in recent yearn
as the utilisation of grassroots tactics has greatly increased.
Principal Purpose
*** tne Harries case, the Court made it clear that the phrase
'principal purpose" excludes from coverage those contributions and per-
sons having only an incidental purpose of influencing legislation. Many
large organisations* such as NAM, seisse upon the "principal purpose
phrase as exempting them from registering and reporting under the 194©
Act. NAM contends that it is a multipurpose organisation and that influ-
encing legislation is not its principal purpose. The general counsels of
the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce agree that any workable lobbying
regulation must define the legal meaning of "seeking to influence legisla-
tion. ' One of many examples of the abuse of the principal purpose *
interpretation was cited by JDeakin:
For three month*, Crawford H. Oreenewsit, president oi the
mammoth S. h du Pont de Nemours, lobbied intensively up and
down the halls of Congress to put through the du Pont stockholders
tax relief bill. The bill, which was passed and signed by President
Milton A. Smith, General Counsel, Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, and Lester H. Miller, General Counsel, National Asso-
ciation oi Manufacturers, i» a private interview on March 6 and March 3,
196$. respectively.
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Kennecy, permitted du Pont atoch holders to pay a lower capital gain*
tax rather than straight income tax on General Motor a stock they
received under a court divestiture order.
Greenewait visited more than 50 Congressmen tttd top govern-
ment officials to plug for the bill. Ha talked with the late Speaker
Sam Rayburn, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, and most of
the other Democratic and Republican leader© of the House and Senate.
He conferred several times with Chairman Wilbur 0. Mills of the
tax -writing House Ways and Means Committee, and he saw almost
all tl the J 5 Democratic members of Ways and Means.
This was lobbying activity o/ a sustained sort but Greenewait
did not register under the Lobbying Act. One of his associates
explained that the du Font president is not paid his salary for the
principal purpose of lobbying. This is obviously true, so, in the
Alice -in -Wonderland world of lobbying, he was lobbying but was not
a lobbyist. ]
An organisation which works only occasionally to influence legis-
lation may. at a particular time and for a limited period, exert much
influence in connection with a specific piece of legislation. Most organi-
sations interpret principal purpose " as permitting them to operate with-
out registration unless it can be proven that rn<kr«t than 50 per cent of their
total activities constitute lobbying.
No £nforeement ^«ncy
As a U.S. Senator in IW, the late President John F. Kennedy
declared that the chief defect of the lobbying law was its failure to deslg-
nate an agency or official to administer ^n4 enforce it. There is neither
a body nor authority to administer It, to examine the statements to deter-
mine if the terms of the statute have been complied with, and to investigate
Deakin, The Lobbyists
, pp. 20-21.
*Ibid.
, p. 255.
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individuals or organisations that have not tiled. The reader will recall
from Chapter III ths account oi Attorney General Tom Clark's action in
1947 to set up a lobbying enforcement agency even though the 1946 Act
contains no authority for such action.
Lobbying authorities and laymen alike disagree on what agency
should enforce lobbying activities. President Kennedy and David 0.
Truman were among those recommending the Department of Justice for
this function. Dr. Belle Zeller recommended an administrative agency
with powers similar to those now enjoyed by the Securities smd Exchange
Commission. The McClellan committee in 1956, the Senate Rules Com-
1
mittee investigating the Bobby Baker scandal in 1964, and 5. 355- all
recommended the Comptroller General. Others have recommended a
Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, as recently as Congress*
man H. A. Smith's (R-Calif.) bill (H.R. 156&7) introduced February 29,
1968.*
Neither the Clerk of the Hcuse nor the Secretary of the Senate has
the administrative facilities to analyse relevant information submitted
under the 1946 Act, make pertinent abstracts from it, adopt an efficient
classification ami indexing system, or tabulate and summarize the infor-
mation filed by registrants. As to enforcement, the Department of Justice
. ISi */as passed by the Senate by a 79 to 5 vote on March 6,
1967. It was referred to the House Rules Committee on March 9, 1967,
and remauiev there a year later.
Congressional Record, CXIV, No. 31 (February 29, 1968),
H 1541-2.
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which enforce* the criminal provisions of the Act is hampered by being in
a different branch of the government and having facilities for investigation
that are already overtaxed.
The Ideal (?) Lobbying Act
Although the writer recognises that any legislation that covers
all lobbying activities would surely run afoul qI the First Amendment, the
need to design an effective and enforceable lobbying act still exists today.
The inadequacies and vagaries of the 1946 Act reduce its effectiveness in
presenting to Congress and the Nation a true picture of what lobbyists are
doing and how much they are spending in the Nation's capital.
Many different versions o« lobb ing legislation are introduced
during each session ol Congress, Two of the lobbying bills introduced
during the Ninetieth Congress are discussed below.
Legislative Reorganisation Act oi 1967
Title V (Regulation of Lobbying) of this Act (5. 355) was proposed
by the Special Committee on the Organization ol the Congress. It was
introduced on the Senate floor by Senator A. S. Mike Monroney (D-Okla.
)
on January 14, 1967* and was passed by an overwhelming margin in the
Senate on March 6, 1967. On March 9, $9£7, S. 355 was referred to the
House Rules Committee, where it seemingly is dying a slow but certain
death at this writing. This delay appear* to be due primarily to provisions
of other titles of the Act calling for extensive restructuring of the present
committee system.
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The principal provisions of Title V are:
1. Designation of the Comptroller General of the United States
a* administrator of the Act.
2. Application to any person who solicits or receives money or
other consideration a substantial purpose oi which is to be usee? to
aid, or a substantial purpose of which person is to ait1 In lobbying.
3. Requirement tor filing of report* ta include only the portions
which are covered by the Act, where contributions or expenditures
are imolved v/hich are partly for purposes coverec by the L>obby Act
and partly for other purposes.
Legislative Reorganisation Act oj; 1968.
Concerning regulation of lobbying. Title V of Congressman
Smith's H.R. 15687:
1. Vests administration in a Joint Committee On Congressional
Operations empowered to conduct hearings on activities which intend
to influence legislation. U also empowers this committee to investi-
gate incidents of executive branch lobbying with appropriated moneys.
2. Applies the substantial purpose rule in a similar manner
oi that of S. 3
3. Applies S. 3SVs guidelines on reporting contributions and
expenditures.
The writer's recommendations for the major provisions of a
lobbying act are outlined in the following chapter. Although his proposal
may not be considered an ideal lobbying act, if enacted by Congress it
would be a step in the right direction toward effective lobbying legislation.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The i#§t effective control of lobbying, and
perhaps all that is really needed, is the election
of highly qualifier responsible person* to public
office. 1
-• James X)eaUin
The historical development o; this Nation indicates that substantial
attention hu been focused on the activities of lobbyists over a long period
01 time. It seems clear that the 1946 Act has not produced results adequate
to satisfy those most interested in maiiitainlng extensive knowledge of
lobbyists* activities and expenditures. The somewhat incidental «3iforts to
introduce change suggest that the urgency oi change is felt by only a rela-
tively few legislators. Yet there seems* to be enough support to bring about
some change in lobbying legislation as an adjunct to other legislative action.
The seriousne«s of those who are strongly interested, and the
progress made to date, suggest that change ie feasible. The political expe-
diency described below suggests the imminent probability of some action.
As a tfirat etep, Congress trust enact an effective lobbying law
thst covers jrassroota and direct contact by lobbyists and provides for
rigorous enforcement. The relatively few congressmen who are concerned
about th« ill effects of lobbying must overcome their preoccupation with
treating the effects of lobbying while eis regarding the causes of lobbying
1
The Jbobbyista. p. 326,
7$
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abuses. Unfortunately, coa^rC'islututl refsponenta to Milbrath'* ffem y
indicated air- out no serious d is satisfaction with lobbying and no t'tsposi-
tion to do something further About te^ai regulation.
George Meader, Chief Counsel ot the Senate's Special Committee
on the Organisation o: the Congress, said that The political atmosphere
in this, a Presidential election year, almost guarantees the passage of a
congressional reform bill in some form during the second session of the
Z
Ninetieth Congress. ' Meader did not venture a guess as to whether
S. 335 or H. R. 15637 would be that reform bill; however, he did assist
Congressman Smith in the formulation of H. R. 15687.
Although congressmen have substantially more freedom of action
from lobbyists than is commonly understood, Congre** could lessen its
dependence on the information function of lobbyists by improving its own
procedures and by supplying itself with a greater amount of professional
assistance for committees and individual members. But dispensing with
lobby services without adequate replacement would make Congress even
more dependent on the Executive Branch. The Congress is ill equipped
to compete with the Executive Branch in hiring staff and conducting
research and would be at a serious disadvantage vls-a-vis the Executive
Branch if it were not for alternative sources of information--mainly
Milbrath, The Washington uobbyista, p. 317.
2George Meader, Chief Counsel, Senate Special Committee on
the Organization of Congress, in a private interview on March 5, 1968.
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Lobbyists. However, a balance in dependence upon the alternative sources
of information must continue to be sought by Hm Congress.
Congress, the 535 men and women elected by the people of the
United States to make their laws, remain® the chief battleground o{ the
lobbyists. In fact, most lobbyists spend as much time in "liaison' with
the Executive Branch as with the Congress. Although this liaison is not
within the scope of this thesis, it Is significant that this contact with the
Executive Branch is not considered lobbying by the general public or by
the law. The Chamber of Con mere e of the United States has experienced
noteworthy success in this del*:' with its executive conference®," which
consist of luncheon discussions with members of tho President's Cabinet.
These conferences normally reap valuable advance word on the white
House's intensions on legislation relating to business affairs. In fact,
some of Mllbrath's respondents said that they "find it more efficacious to
influence the interpretation of a bill /In the Executive Branch/ than to par-
te
ticipate in the drafting and passage of it.
Lobbying is an integral part of today's democratic process; the
effort to understand it atv ! enforce it within our constitutional framework
of government will continue a* long as legislation continues to be made by
a Congress elected by th<* people. Lobbying should not be universally con-
demned because of isolated incidents such as the Natural Gas case in 1956.
Dea- in, The Lobbyists, p. 78.
I
ibrath, The Washington Lobbyists
, p. 33.
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In & complex iocioty such as ours, it is necessary to have respousibU-
lobbying. Not everyone can came to the town meeting "; hence, people
must fflffjit to fftia representation in Congress. The lobbyist U their
proxy whose efforts contribute to the stability oi the syster .
Although the writer recognises the difficulties of drafting
regulation -of -lobbying legislation that woulu accurately reveal th*t ai»e
and scope o; the lobbyist's efforts to influence the congressional decision*
making process, while respecting the guarantees of the First Amendment,
such legislation is needed now. One synthesis drawn from various defini-
tions and enforcement agencies that have been proposed by others, and
which the writer acvocates, follows.
The Comptroller General, bound by the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, would serve as the enforcement agent.
Specifically, the General Accounting Xilce would act as the lobbying
watchdog for the: Legislative Branch just as it serves as the watchdog
in behalf of Congress's "power oi the purse today.
Z
The McClell&n committee's bill (S. «i J 9 1) . providing for dis-
closure of grassroots lobbying costs under certain circumstances, would
be adopted. This would require financial reports from persons ft)
organisations who conduct big campaigns to marshal public sentiment tor
or against a specific legislative issue in Congress.
This provision was not included in S, lift,
Z
See supra, pp, il -68.
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I finally, confusion regarding principal purpose would be
greatly reduced by adoption of President Kennedy's measure which proposed
replacing the term looby 1st with legislative agent. A legislative agent
vt« defined as any person who, for pay, engages himself to influence
legislation . . . and who . . , devotes any portion of his time to efforts to
influence legislation.
Properly applied, lobbying can assist the legislative process and
further the public interest. This will come about when the role of the
lobbyist is clearly understood and his actions are subjected to attention
sufficient and searching enough that legislator© and the public will not
tolerate abuses in lobbying.
S. 2303 would have amended the .Legislative Reorganisation Act
of 1946.

APPSNDIX
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
Title IU o£ the Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1946
UTt, 79th Cong. , 2d see*. , Pub. LawfcCH: 2 U.S.C. 261-270)
Be it enacted by ttie Senate and House o£ liepresenta
tlvee of the United States of America in Congress
assembler:
TITLE HI—REGULATION OF LOBBYING
ACT
Short TitleMIMMIWMIMHMIMMl
Sec. 30 1. This title may be cited as the Federal Regulation of Lobby-
ing Act.
Definitions
Sec. 302. When used in this title --
(a) The t^rm contribution includes a gift, subscription, loan,
advance, or deposit of money or anything of value and includes a contract,
promise, or agreement, whether ot not legally enforceable, ta make a
contribution.
(b) Th? tcrr.\ 'expenditure" includes a payment, distribution, loan,
advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, and includes a con-
tract, promise, or a.|r««ment, whether or not legally enforceable, to make
an expenditure.
(c) Th^ term person includes an individual, partnership, committee,
association, corporation, and any other organisation or group of persons.
(d) The term Clerk means the Clerk of the House of Representatives
of the United states.
O) The term legislation " means bills, resolutions, amendments,
nominations, and other matters pending or proposed in either House of
Congress, and includes sny other matter which may be the subject of action
by either House.
a4
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Detailed Account* of Contributions
Sec. 303. (a) It shall be the duty of every person who shall in any
manner solicit or receive a contribution to any organisation or fund for the
purposes hereinafter designated to keep a detailed and exact account oi--
(!) all contributions o£ any amount or of any value whatsoever;
(2) the name and address of every person making any such con-
tribution oi $500 or more and the date thereof;
(3) all expenditures made by or on behalf of such organisation
or fund; anc<
(4) the name and address of every person to whom any such
expenditure is made and the date thereof.
(b) It shall be the duty of such person to obtain and keep a receipted
bill* stating the particulars, for every expenditure of such funds exceeding
$10 in amount, and to preserve all receipted bills and accounts required to
be kept by this section for a period of at least two years from the date of
the filing of the statement containing such items.
Receipts tor Contributions
&«c. 304. Every individual who receives a contribution o£ $500 or
more for any of the purposes hereinafter designated shall within five days
alter receipt thereof r^odmre^ to the person or organisation for which such
contribution was received a detailed account thereof, including the name
and &Qdr9s& oi the person making such contribution and the date on which
received.
Statements To Be Filed with Clerk of House
i nII ii ii H i mm - ii «« .<«—pi.~-pmh :-mi»iii—M i m il* ' »> » m m m** i -ui— »- i n . «m. pp—>p^»
Sec. 305. (a) £very person receiving any contributions or expending
any money for the purposes designated in subparagraph (a) or (b) of section
30? shall file with the Clerk between the first and tenth day of each calen-
dar quarter, a statement containing complete as of the day next preceding
the date of filing—
( 1) the name and address of each person who has made a con-
tribution of $500 or more not mentioned in the preceding report;
except that the first report filed pursuant to this title shall contain
the name and address of each person who has made any contribution
of $500 or more to such person since the effective date oi this title;
(2) the total sum of the contributions made to qw for such person
during the calendar year and not stated under paragraph (J);
(3) the total sum of all contributions made to or for such person
during the calendar year;

N(4) the a»m« and address of each person to whom an expenditures
in one or more items of the aggregate amount or value* within the
calendar year, of $\Q or more has been mad* by or on behalf of such
person, and the amount, date, and purpose o( such expenditure;
(5) the total sum oi all expenditures made by or on behalf of
such person during the calendar year and not stated under paragraph
(4);
(6) the total sum tH expenditures made by or on behalf of such
person during the calendar year.
(b) The statements required to be filed by subsection (a) shall be
cumulative during the calendar year to which they relate, but where there
has been no change in an item reported in a previous statement only the
amount need be carried forward.
statement Preserved for Two Years
Sec. 306. A statement required by this title to be filed with the
Clerk-
-
(a) shall be deemed properly filed when deposited in an established
post office within the prescribed time, duly stamped, registered, and
directed to the Clerk of the House of Representatives of the United States,
Washington, District of Columbia, but in the event it is not received, a
duplicate of such statement shall be promptly filed upon notice by the
Clerk of its nonreceipt;
(b) shall be preserved by the Cler*i ior a period of two years from the
date of filing, shall constitute part of the public records of his office, and
snail be open to public inspection.
Persons To Whom Applicable
Sec. 307. The provisions of this title shall apply to any person
(except a political committee as defined in the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act, and duly organised Mate or local committees of a political party),
who by himself, or through any agent or employee or other persons in any
manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receivee
money or any other thing oi value to be used principally to aid, or the
principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any
of the ioilowing purposes:
(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the
United States.
(b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat ot any
legislation by the Congress of the United States.
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Registration with Secretary of the senate and Clerk oi the House
Sec. 308. (a) Aay person who shall engage hlmseli for pay or for
any consideration for the purpose oi attempting to influence the passage
or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States shall*
before doing anything in furtherance of such object, register with the
Clerk of the House of Rapre (tentative * and the Secretary of the Senate and
shall give to tho e officers in writing and under oath, his name and busi-
ness address, the a*tne *nd address of the person by whom he is employed.
and In whose interest he .Appears or works, the duration of such employ-
ment, how much he is paid and is to receive, by whom he is paid or is to
ba paid, how much he is to be paid for expenses, and what expenses are
to be included. £ach such person so registering shall, between the first
d tenth day oi each calendar quarter, so long as his activity continues,
file with the Clerk and Secretary a detailed report under oath of all money
received and expended by him during the preceding calendar quarter in
carrying on hia work; to whom paid; for what purposes; and the names of
any p&pisr*, periodicals, magazines, or other publications in which he
has caused to be published any articles or editorials; and the proposed
legislation he is employed to support or oppose. The provisions of this
section shall not apply to any person who merely appears before a commit-
tees of the Congress of the United States in support oi or opposition to
legislation; nor to any public official acting in his official capacity; nor in
the cane of any newspaper or other regularly published periodical (includ-
ing any individual who owns, publishes, or is employed by any such news-
paper or periodical) which in the ordinary course of business publishes
news items, editorials, or other comments, or paid advertisements,
which directly or indirectly urge the passage or defeat of legislation, if
such newspaper, periodical, or individual, engages in no further or other
activities in connection with the passage or defeat oi such legislation,
other than to appear before a committee of the Congress of the United
States in support of or in opposition to such legislation.
(b) All information required to be filed under the provisions of this
section with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary
of the Senate shall be compiled by said Clerk and Secretary, acting jointly*
as soon as practicable after the close of the calendar quarter with respect
to which such information is filed and shall be printed in the Congressional
Record.
Reports and Statements To Be Made Under teth
Sec. $09. All reports and statements required under thi* title shall
be made under oath, before an officer authorized by law to administer
oath*
.

as
Penalties
Sat* 310. (a) Any parson who violates any of the provisions of this
title, shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be
punished by i fine of not more than $5, 000 or imprisonment Ifctf not mora
than twelve months, or by both such fine and Imprisonment.
(b) lu addition to the penalties provided for in subsection (a), any
person convicted oi the misdemeanor specified therein ia prohibited, for
a period o- three years (fm the date of such conviction, from attempting
to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any proposed
legislation or from appearing before a committee of the Congress in sup-
port of or opposition to proposed legislation; and any person who violates
any provision of this subsection shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty
oi a felony, and shall be punished by a fine §| not more than $10, 000, or
imprisonment for not more than five years, or fey both such fin© and
imprisonment.
Exemption
Sec. 311. The provisions of this titly shall not apply to practices or
activities regulated by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act nor be construed
as repealing any portion of said Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
ft
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